# Doubles UK vs Texas DK

# 1NC

## Off

**1NC---T**

Topicality---

**Interpretation---the aff should only win the debate if they can prove an instance of the resolution is true.**

**The USfg is made up of three branches in Washington D.C.**

**Dictionary of Government and Politics ’98** (Ed. P.H. Collin, p. 292)

United States of America (USA) [ju:’naitid ‘steits av e’merike] noun independent country, a federation of states (originally thirteen, now fifty in North America; the United States Code = book containing all the permanent laws of the USA, arranged in sections according to subject and revised from time to time COMMENT: the federal government (based in Washington D.C.) is formed of a legislature (the Congress) with two chambers (the Senate and House of Representatives), an executive (the President) and a judiciary (the Supreme Court). Each of the fifty states making up the USA has its own legislature and executive (the Governor) as well as its own legal system and constitution

**Expanding the scope requires Congressional action**

**King 19** – Attorney, BurnsBarton PLC

Kathryn Hackett King, Defendants State of Arizona, Davidson, and Shannon’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Toomey v. State of Arizona, et al., US District Court for the District of Arizona, January 2019, LexisNexis

In Title VII, Congress made clear it was unlawful for an employer to discriminate “because of sex.” Plaintiff claims the State Defendants discriminated against him because of his transgender status, but as explained in the Motion (with supporting case law), (i) courts cannot expand Title VII without congressional action, and (ii) Congress has repeatedly had the opportunity to enact legislation to add gender identity to Title VII, but has not done so. (Doc. 24, p.9-10). Plaintiff cannot refute that when Title VII does not protect a particular category, legislative action is required to change that.5 Plaintiff argues Congress’s failure to enact new legislation to add gender identity is not relevant because later acts of Congress are not probative of prior legislative intent. But the point is that **expanding** the **scope** of a **federal statute requires congressional**, **not judicial**, **action**. Gunnison v. Comm. of Int. Rev., 461 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1972) (“Further expansion of the favored treatment specifically provided in §402(a)(2) as an exercise of legislative grace is a **function for the Congress**, **not for the Courts**”). Yet here, Congress has failed to act to expand Title VII. Congress’s failure to act demonstrates Title VII does not include unenumerated categories. Bibby v. Phil. Coca Cola, 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our society….Congress has not yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such harassment”).

**“Core antitrust laws” refers to the Sherman and Clayton Act**

**The Antitrust Division 07** – Law enforcement agency that enforces the U.S. antitrust laws

“Antitrust Division Statement Regarding the Release of the Antitrust Modernization Commission Report,” The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, April 2007, https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press\_releases/2007/222344.htm

The AMC has made many specific recommendations in its report, and the Division is in the process of reviewing all of them. The Division commends the AMC for its three primary conclusions:

Free-market competition should remain the touchstone of United States' economic policy. The Commission's conclusion in this regard is a fundamental starting point for policy makers. Over a century of experience has shown that robust competition among businesses, each striving to be increasingly successful, leads to better quality products and services, lower prices, and higher levels of innovation.

The **core antitrust laws**—**Sherman Act sections 1 and 2** and **Clayton Act section 7**—and their application by the courts and federal enforcement agencies are sound and appropriately safeguard the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.

New or different rules are not needed for industries in which innovation, intellectual property, and technological innovation are central features. Unlike some other areas of the law, the core antitrust laws are **general in nature** and have been **applied to many different industries** to protect free-market competition successfully over a long period of time despite changes in the economy and the increasing pace of technological advancement. One of the great benefits of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is their **adaptability** to **new economic conditions** without sacrificing their ability to protect competition.

**“Prohibitions” are laws that forbid action**

**Sweet 03** – Judge, United States District Court, New York Southern

Robert W. Sweet, Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Mirasco, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 303, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, March 2003, LexisNexis

In any case, even if the word "embargo" does not stretch so far, there is no doubt that the restriction against the importation of all IBP goods constitutes a "prohibition" under Clause D. HN15 "**Prohibition**" is defined by **Black's Law Dictionary** to be "a **law or order** that **forbids a certain action**." Black's Law Dictionary 1228 (7th ed. 1999). The dictionary definition is similar: "a **declaration** or **injunction forbidding some action**." Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged 1978 (2d ed. 1944). The common understanding of the word "prohibition" has similar connotations, with one exception. As Mirasco points out, any governmental action -- including the rejection on which insurance coverage is based -- could potentially be deemed a prohibition under the definitions above as a declaration forbidding the entry of goods. Therefore, a **prohibition** must be **qualitatively different** from a **rejection**. That difference is that the **prohibition occurs prior to** the government's dealing with the **specific** cargo at issue and is of a **more sweeping nature** than the **simple administrative function** performed by customs officials determining whether or not goods should be permitted into the country. Decree # 6 is such a prohibition, in that it was a **law or declaration** -- **issued prior to**, **separate from and broader than** the Egyptian authorities' administrative determination of whether the M/V Spero cargo should be permitted entry -- that forbids the importation of IBP products.

**Two impacts---**

**[1]---Role of the neg---the alternative to the resolution is no topic whatsoever---it lets the aff pick the literature base of the day and set arbitrary standards which structurally favors the aff because neg preparation is dependent on predictable stasis. The neg burden to disprove the aff does not exist sans a topical aff, because there is no structural basis for understanding how the negative should engage otherwise. It’s an impact---it does not make coherent sense to burden the neg with disproving the aff if they have not met their burden to prove an instance of the resolution true, and procedural questions are the only thing that the ballot can resolve.**

**[2]---Clash---debates over a controversial stasis point force continual iteration over the course of a year in response to new arguments. A resolutional model guarantees negative teams will always be prepared and have substantive answers to any 1AC, and abandoning it eliminates research incentives since the aff will always change the 1AC before the 2AC**

**1NC—Antitrust Counteradvocacy**

**Counteradvocacy—**

**The United States federal government should:**

**First—**

--raise the minimum wage to $15

--increase federal investment in employment opportunities

--increase tax credits for those with lowest wages

--enhance enforcement of labor protection laws including rights to form unions

--close loopholes exempting independent contractors from labor laws

--provide remedies for workers that demonstrate employers violate labor laws

**Second—**

--should substantially increase incentives and support for research, development, demonstration, and deployment of carbon capture and storage technologies

--substantially increase restrictions on private sector greenhouse gas emissions

**Third—**

--prohibit platform conduct that fails under the rule of reason without imposing heightened burdens on plaintiffs.

**This counterplan is an example: the thesis of our counteradvocacy is that a preferable strategy is to adopt policies that solve the harms of status-quo neoliberal capitalism without throwing the baby out with the bathwater – The net benefit is that a neoliberal competition policy is good, because while SOME THINGS including for example healthcare and CCS should NOT be markets, there are many things that should be, because markets are uniquely effective at driving key incentives –**

**Coniglio**, antitrust attorney in the Washington, DC office of Sidley Austin LLP, **‘20**

(Joseph V., “Economizing the Totalitarian Temptation: A Risk-Averse Liberal

Realism for Political Economy and Competition Policy in a Post-Neoliberal Society,” 59

Santa Clara L. Rev. 703)

The implication of the foregoing is that the most pressing task for competition policymakers **may not involve a rethinking of first principles**. The principles of neoliberal competition policy may have ultimately been **proven justified** by an **unprecedented** period of economic growth, **technological progress** and reductions in poverty, and should presumably remain operative as long as they remain the best framework for bringing about these ends. Neither, as we have suggested, must the capitalist **entrepreneur be lost in the process**. The **totalitarian temptation** to submit to **general state control** of the economy-whether it be in the form of communism from below or fascism from above **should be resisted** so as to preserve and build upon the great prosperity Western Civilization has managed to achieve.

This statement will no doubt be highly unsatisfactory to many critics of neoliberalism who seek more **fundamental and revolutionary changes**. Surely, they suggest, **there must be some principled basis** for **critiquing the neoliberal status quo** with which so many are frustrated. Indeed, **there very well may be,** and **none of the arguments in this article should be understood to the contrar**y. The goal of this article has been **limited to a tailored defense of neoliberal principles** only **as they relate to competition policy**, broadly understood. It does not suggest that neoliberal monetary, trade, and fiscal policies are also sound**-let alone a neoliberal social order**, where all the core institutions within society are organized **according to the neoliberal principles** of wealthmaximization, empiricism, and the rest.129 This is to say that even if neoliberalism is a sound theory as applied to the area of competition policy, neoliberal monetary policy, for example, may be problematic and a just target for contemporary critics. Similarly, **claiming** that competition **policy should be enforced using a consumer welfare standard** **does not mean that all the organs of law and civil society should be oriented to maximize wealth** or consumer welfare, even if this economic inquiry is nonetheless informative. 30 It is well known that several prominent neoliberals have expanded the neoliberal policy apparatus beyond the regulation of market capitalism with which antitrust is concerned to domains typically understood to be beyond a purely utilitarian purview.' 3 ' However, whatever the merits of these broader neoliberal policy programs, **the competition policy baby, so to speak, should not be thrown out with the bathwater.**

Consider the charge that neoliberal policies have increased wealth inequality in the United States. Some commentators attempt to link this increased inequality **with a decline in competition**'3 2 and, by implication, consumer welfare competition policy. Notwithstanding the interest such theories appeared to have garnered from highly distinguished economists and policymakers, such as Nobel Laureate Joe Stiglitz,133 one might alternatively consider **whether increasing wealth inequality** and the resultant social strife are far more a result of policies **in other areas**, such as monetary policy. 134 At the same time as Chicago School antitrust policy took root, the American economy began to undergo sustained expansions in the money supply and reductions in interest rates that, at least in theory, disproportionately reward the owners of financial assets, who are more likely to be wealthy. 135

Indeed, after the financial crisis, monetary policy engaged in a truly unprecedented expansion, with the Federal Reserve lowering interest rates to zero and increasing its balance sheet from approximately $900 billion before the crisis to $4.5 trillion after, most of which constituted either troublesome mortgage-backed securities or treasury bonds. 36 The share of wealth of the world's richest people roughly doubled. 37 At the same time, however, one would seem to **look in vain** for any **shift toward an increased laissez faire competition policy** during the Obama administration. Indeed, antitrust enforcement under the Obama administration arguably increased relative to the George W. Bush administration, even if only at the margins and not in the area of monopolization. 3

**First plank solves inequality**

**PIIE ’20** – Peterson Institute for International Economics, think tank based in DC

“How to Fix Economic Inequality? An Overview of Policies for the United States and Other High-Income Economies” <https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/how-to-fix-economic-inequality.pdf>

LABOR POLICIES

Raise the federal minimum wage and wages for essential low-paying jobs

**Raising the federal minimum wage would help the lowest paid workers in states that have not already introduced their own higher minimum wages**. Opponents say raising the minimum wage would burden employers and reduce the number of jobs available, but several studies find there is little effect on employment.

Jobs in childcare, nursing, elder care, food service, and healthcare are vital to society, but they pay poorly with little to no opportunities for advancement. **Workers** in these fields **need higher wages** and career progression opportunities **to raise social mobility.** These jobs are also less susceptible to automation.

Enforce existing minimum wage laws.

Some employers evade minimum wage laws by classifying employees as independent workers, deducting company costs from wages (for example, taking the cost of a uniform from an employee’s pay), failing to pay overtime, and through other forms of wage theft.

One study suggests that the total wages US employers steal by violating minimum wage and other labor laws exceeds $15 billion each year. More resources to combat wage theft and incentives for compliance would help.

Increase government investment in job creation programs

Fiscal and monetary stimulus—more government investment in job-creating projects—can be more effective than specific government transfer programs to spur a “hot economy” that pushes wages up faster than prices, according to Jason Furman (PIIE). **Governments can** also **spend** on infrastructure or other programs **to generate employment** (which was done during 2009-10), supplement worker income, or train workers for jobs, as programs did during the Great Depression.

Give employees more bargaining power at companies.

Richard Freeman (Harvard University) calls **trade unions the one “institutional force that fights against inequality.”** Several experts point out that as US union membership has fallen, **worker bargaining power has declined**. As a result, growth in labor productivity has benefitted mainly top wage earners. Easing restrictions on the formation of unions would help. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) says **corporations should have nonexecutive workers serve on their boards**, the way some German companies do.

Many experts advocate for empowering unions to bargain for better compensation, benefits, access to training, and education. A recent Business Roundtable initiative recommends that big companies make commitments to all stakeholders, including workers and customers, not just investor shareholders.

Protect workers in the “gig economy” and other alternative work arrangements.

Shifts in technology and labor arrangements, such as temporary, part-time, on-call, and selfemployment jobs, have sometimes disadvantaged workers. Firms are incentivized to hire or classify existing workers as independent contractors because they do not have to provide them with traditional labor protections and worker benefits. The **government can develop universal and portable systems that give social protections** and benefits **for** these **workers** and prevent worker misclassification.

**Create a federal job guarantee**.

The federal government can become the employer of “last resort” through a National Investment Employment Corps spending $750 billion to $1.5 trillion while eliminating the need for some antipoverty programs, argues William Darity Jr. (Duke University). A federal job guarantee **would cut inequality** by lifting the lowest earners and **protecting employment opportunities for groups subject to discrimination**.

Richard Freeman (Harvard University) maintains that a federal job guarantee could have been effective at managing the economic shock of the COVID-19 crisis. It could have put newly unemployed workers to work on critical government projects, such as contact tracing, at a wage above the poverty level. As economies rebuild, the federal government can facilitate access to labor through job programs that expand during periods of economic slowdown and shrink during periods of private sector job growth. The same can be said of the need for climate-related labor—federal governments can provide jobs to work on critical green projects.

Expand Trade Adjustment Assistance beyond trade-affected workers.  
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) is much criticized as ineffective, but those who received training through the program enjoyed substantial increases in earnings. **The program falls short because** of its limited scope—**it only helps workers demonstrably hurt** by trade, **not by technology or other factors beyond their control**. Removing the conditions and expanding the TAA program to include workers displaced by automation and other factors would deliver the program’s benefits to a wider group of recipients.

**Second plank solves climate change—Keeping warming below 2 degrees is impossible without CCS**

**DOE 16**

US DOE, Issue Brief: Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage: Climate Change, Economic Competitiveness, and Energy Security, August 2016, <https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/09/f33/DOE%20Issue%20Brief%20-%20Carbon%20Capture%20Utilization%20and%20Storage_2016-08-31.pdf>

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technologies provide a **key pathway** to **address the urgent U.S. and global need** **for affordable, secure, resilient, and reliable sources of clean energy.** In the United States, fossil fuel-fired power plants account for **30% of total** U.S. greenhouse gas (**GHG) emissions** and **will continue to be a** **major part of global energy consumption for decades** to come. **CCUS technology is necessary to meet climate change mitigation goals** at the lowest possible cost to society, **but its widespread deployment will require continued improvements in cost and performance. In addition, key sources within the industrial sector, which accounts for 21% of total U.S. GHG emissions, cannot be deeply decarbonized without CCUS**. **A combination of tax incentives and research, development, demonstration, and deployment** (RDD&D) **will be critical to developing transformational carbon capture technologies and to driving down the costs of capture**. 2 DOE Issue Brief Issue Brief Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage: Climate Change, Economic Competitiveness, and Energy Security BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT Mitigating global climate change while creating economic opportunities and providing affordable, secure, resilient, and reliable clean energy is one of the preeminent challenges of our time. Advancing no- and low-carbon energy technologies to help meet these challenges is a primary goal of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). However, investment in and deployment of CCUS technology lags other clean energy technologies. **Stronger policies would provide the financing and market certainty needed for deployment and to develop supply chains, commercial infrastructure, and ultimately, private sector investment** **in CCUS technologies**. **Continued RDD&D is also critical to improving performance and driving down the costs of CCUS technologies**. CCUS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE **There is international consensus that CCUS will play a critical role as part of an economically sustainable route to the emissions cuts needed to limit global warming to 2°C.**1 In 2014, **the** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (**IPCC) concluded that without CCUS, the costs of climate change mitigation could increase by 138%, and** further, **that** **realizing a 2°C scenario may not even be possible without CCUS technologies**. 2 In dollar terms, the additional investment needed in the absence of CCUS in the electricity sector to limit warming to a 2°C scenario is estimated to total $2 trillion over 40 years.3 International Energy Agency (IEA) models of the technology mix needed **to meet a 2°C scenario show that CCUS will need to contribute about one sixth of global CO2 emission reductions in 2050**, and 14% of the cumulative emissions reductions between 2015 and 2050 compared to a business-as-usual approach.4 In order to realize the level of mitigation from CCUS that IEA projects would be needed to limit warming to 2°C, industrial and power sector applications of CCUS would need to contribute a greenhouse gas reduction of 7 Gigatonnes per year by 2050.5 IEA estimates that achieving these reductions would require a total global deployment of more than 950 GW of new and retrofitted power generation capacity with CCS, equivalent to roughly 2,000 500 megawatt coal-fired power plants, each emitting 3.5 million metric tons of CO2. 6 **In addition to the critical role that CCUS plays in decarbonizing the electric power sector, deep decarbonization of key sources in the industrial sector will not be possible without CCUS**. 7 In the IEA’s 2°C scenario models mentioned above, **approximately half (45%) of the total global emissions reductions between 2015 and 2050 are from industrial sector use of CCS in applications which cannot be replaced by renewable or other non-emitting energy technologies**.8 **Finally, IEA modeling of emissions scenarios to keep the temperature rise below 2°C reveal that the GHG emissions reductions needed could only be achieved “with bioenergy with CCS** (**BECCS) using sustainably produced feedstocks and afforestation, and/or with other CO2 removal technologies that are deployed widely by the second half of the century.”9**

**Third plank is a tailored adjustment that makes antitrust awesome—Key to military AI**

**Foster and Arnold ’20** – Researchers at ***Georgetown’s*** Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Dakota; Visiting Researcher at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, graduate student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, conducted research on terrorism and U.S. national security policy for the U.S. military, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Washington Institute; Zachary; Research Fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, where he focuses on AI investment flows and workforce trends, J.D. from Yale Law School; 2020; "Antitrust and Artificial Intelligence: How Breaking Up Big Tech Could Affect the Pentagon’s Access to AI"; Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University; https://www.geopolitic.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CSET-Antitrust-and-Artificial-Intelligence.pdf; accessed 8-10-2021]

3. Are smaller vendors more likely to produce innovative products that meet the Pentagon’s needs?

Tech industry leaders have relatively **little incentive** to work with the Pentagon. Their companies already enjoy **broad customer bases** and financial independence from U.S. government contracts—including those **at the Pentagon**.89 DOD contracts involve **applying** AI technology in varied, complex, and **operationally demanding** environments with **low tolerance** for error. Similarly, industry has **little motivation** to take on unique DOD **data management** and privacy requirements, such as data compartmentalization, protection against deceptive or compromised data inputs, and strict **data accountability** provisions complicating **algorithm training**.90 Finally, some commercial AI advances will easily convert into Pentagon applications. Others will require significant, difficult adaption and productization.

Antitrust action could create **smaller AI firms** targeting DOD business as their “**niche**.” With the Pentagon as their **sole customer**, these firms could focus on its unique needs, tailoring broader AI innovations for the Pentagon through **productization** and **organizational adaptation**. They could follow the example of **Palantir**, which makes 50 percent of its revenue from **government contracts**,91 or Kratos (60 percent).92 In the last five years, a **number of companies** have emerged in this mold, including Anduril Labs (2017), Shield AI (2015), Descartes Labs (2014), and Uptake (2014). As smaller firms’ primary, high-value customer, the Pentagon can **dictate** their innovation objectives, ultimately yielding AI applications better suited to **defense needs**.

**Great power war**

**Brose ’19** – Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Christian; Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 2019; "The New Revolution in Military Affairs"; Foreign Affairs; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/new-revolution-military-affairs>]

The idea of a future military revolution became discredited amid nearly two decades of war after 2001 and has been further damaged by reductions in defense spending since 2011. But along the way, the United States has also **squandered** hundreds of **billions** of dollars trying to modernize in the **wrong ways**. Instead of thinking systematically about buying faster, more **effective kill chains** that could be built now, Washington poured **money** into **newer versions** of **old military platforms** and **prayed** for **technological miracles** to come (which often became acquisition debacles when those miracles did not materialize). The result is that U.S. battle networks are not nearly as **fast** or **effective** as they have appeared while the United States has been fighting lesser opponents for almost three decades.

Yet if ever there were a time to **get serious** about the coming revolution in **military affairs**, it is **now**. There is an emerging consensus that the United States' top **defense-planning priority** should be **contending** with **great powers** with **advanced militaries**, primarily **China**, and that **new technologies**, once intriguing but speculative, are now both **real** and **essential** to **future military advantage**. Senior military leaders and defense experts are also starting to agree, albeit belatedly, that when it comes to these threats, the United States is **falling dangerously behind**.

This reality demands more than a revolution in technology; it requires a revolution in thinking. And that thinking must focus more on how the U.S. military fights than with what it fights. The problem is not **insufficient spending** on defense; it is that the U.S. military is being countered by **rivals** with **superior strategies**. The United States, in other words, is playing a **losing game**. The question, accordingly, is not how **new technologies** can improve the U.S. military's ability to do what it already does but how they can enable it to operate in **new ways**. If American defense officials do not answer that question, there will still be a **revolution in military affairs**. But it will primarily **benefit others**.

It is still possible for the United States to adapt and succeed, but the scale of change required is enormous. The **traditional model** of U.S. **military power** is being **disrupted**, the way Blockbuster's business model was amid the rise of Amazon and Netflix. A military made up of **small numbers** of **large**, **expensive**, **heavily manned**, and **hard-to replace** systems will not **survive** on **future battlefields**, where swarms of **intelligent machines** will deliver violence at a **greater volume** and **higher velocity** than **ever before**. Success will require a **different kind of military**, one built around **large numbers** of **small**, **inexpensive**, **expendable**, and **highly autonomous** systems. The United States has the money, human capital, and technology to assemble that kind of military. The question is whether it has the imagination and the resolve.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES, OLD PROBLEMS

**Artificial intelligence** and other emerging technologies will change the way **war is fought**, but they will not change its nature. Whether it involves longbows or source code, war will always be violent, politically motivated, and composed of the same three elemental functions that new recruits learn in basic training: move, shoot, and communicate.

Movement in warfare entails **hiding** and **seeking** (attackers try to evade detection; defenders try to detect them) and **penetrating** and **repelling** (attackers try to enter opponents’ space; defenders try to deny them access). But in a world that is becoming one giant sensor, hiding and penetrating—never easy in warfare—will be far more difficult, if not impossible. The amount of data generated by networked devices, the so-called Internet of Things, is on pace to triple between 2016 and 2021. More significant, the proliferation of low-cost, commercial sensors that can detect more things more clearly over greater distances is already providing more **real-time global surveillance** than has existed at any time in history. This is especially true in space. In the past, the high costs of launching satellites required them to be large, expensive, and designed to orbit for decades. But as access to space gets cheaper, satellites are becoming more like mobile phones—mass-produced devices that are used for a few years and then replaced. Commercial space companies are already fielding hundreds of small, cheap satellites. Soon, there will be thousands of such satellites, providing an unblinking eye over the entire world. Stealth technology is living on borrowed time.

On top of all of that, quantum sensors—which use the bizarre properties of subatomic particles, such as their ability to be in two different places at once—will eventually be able detect disruptions in the environment, such as the displacement of air around aircraft or water around submarines. Quantum sensors will likely be the first usable application of quantum science, and this technology is still many years off. But once quantum sensors are fielded, there will be nowhere to hide.

The future of movement will also be characterized by a return of mass to the battlefield, after many decades in which the trend was moving in the opposite direction—toward an emphasis on quality over quantity—as technology is enabling more systems to get in motion and stay in motion in more places. Ubiquitous sensors will generate **exponentially greater quantities of data**, which in turn will drive both the development and the deployment of **artificial intelligence**. As machines become more autonomous, militaries will be able to field more of them in **smaller sizes** and at **lower costs**. New developments in power generation and storage and in hypersonic propulsion will allow these smaller systems to travel **farther** and **faster** than ever. Where once there was one destroyer, for example, the near future could see dozens of autonomous vessels that are similar to missile barges, ready to strike as targets emerge.

Technology will also transform how those systems remain in motion. Logistics—the ability to supply forces with food, fuel, and replacements—has traditionally been the limiting factor in war. But autonomous militaries will need **less fuel** and **no food**. Advanced manufacturing methods, such as 3-D printing, will reduce the need for vast, risky, and expensive military logistics networks by enabling the production of complicated goods at the point of demand quickly, cheaply, and easily.

In an even more profound change, space will emerge as its own domain of maneuver warfare. So far, the near impossibility of refueling spacecraft has largely limited them to orbiting the earth. But as it becomes feasible to not just refuel spacecraft midflight but also build and service satellites in space, process data in orbit, and capture resources and energy in space for use in space (for example, by using vast solar arrays or mining asteroids), space operations will become less dependent on earth. Spacecraft will be able to maneuver and fight, and the first orbital weapons could enter the battlefield. The technology to do much of this exists already.

THE MILITARIES OF TOMORROW

Technology will also **radically alter** how militaries shoot, both literally and figuratively. **Cyberattacks**, **communication jamming**, **electronic warfare**, and other attacks on a system’s software will become as important as those that target a system’s hardware, if not more so. The rate of fire, or how fast weapons can shoot, will **accelerate** rapidly thanks to new technologies such as lasers, high-powered microwaves, and other directed-energy weapons. But what will really increase the rate of fire are **intelligent systems** that will radically reduce the time between when targets can be identified and when they can be attacked. A harbinger of this much nastier future battlefield has played out in Ukraine since 2014, where Russia has shortened to mere minutes the time between when their spotter drones first detect Ukrainian forces and when their precision rocket artillery **wipes** those **forces off the map.**

The militaries of the future will also be able to **shoot farther** than those of today. Eventually, hypersonic munitions (weapons that travel at more than five times the speed of sound) and space-based weapons will be able to **strike targets anywhere** in the world nearly **instantly**. Militaries will be able to attack domains once assumed to be sanctuaries, such as space and logistics networks. There will be no rear areas or safe havens anymore. **Swarms of autonomous systems** will not only be able to find targets everywhere; they will also be able to shoot them accurately. The ability to have both **quantity** and **quality** in military systems will have **devastating effects**, especially as technology makes lethal payloads smaller.

Finally, the way militaries communicate will **change drastically**. Traditional communications networks—hub-and-spoke structures with vulnerable single points of failure—will not survive. Instead, technology will push vital communications functions to the edge of the network. Every autonomous system will be able to process and make sense of the information it gathers on its own, **without** relying on **a command hub.** This will enable the creation of radically distributed networks that are resilient and reconfigurable.

Technology is also inverting the current paradigm of **command and control**. Today, even a supposedly unmanned system requires dozens of people to operate it remotely, maintain it, and process the data it collects. But as systems become more autonomous, one person will be able to **operate larger numbers** of them **single-handedly**. The opening ceremonies of the 2018 Winter Olympics, in South Korea, offered a preview of this technology when 1,218 autonomous drones equipped with lights collaborated to form intricate pictures in the night sky over Pyeongchang. Now imagine similar autonomous systems being used, for example, to overwhelm an aircraft carrier and render it inoperable.

Further afield, other technologies will change military communications. Information networks based on 5G technology will be capable of moving vastly larger amounts of data at significantly faster speeds. Similarly, the same quantum science that will improve military sensors will transform communications and computing. Quantum computing—the ability to use the abnormal properties of subatomic particles to exponentially increase processing power—will make possible encryption methods that could be unbreakable, as well as give militaries the power to process volumes of data and solve classes of problems that exceed the capacity of classical computers. More incredible still, so-called brain-computer interface technology is already enabling human beings to control complicated systems, such as robotic prosthetics and even unmanned aircraft, with their neural signals. Put simply, it is becoming possible for a human operator to control multiple drones simply by thinking of what they want those systems to do.

Put together, all these technologies will **displace decades-old**, even centuries-old, **assumptions** about how militaries operate. The militaries that embrace and adapt to **these technologies will dominate** those that do not. In that regard, the U.S. military is in **big trouble**.

A LOSING GAME

Since the end of the **Cold War**, the United States' approach to **projecting military force** against regional powers has rested on a series of **assumptions** about how conflicts **will unfold**. The U.S. military assumes that its forces will be able to move **unimpeded** into forward positions and that it will be able to **commence hostilities** at a time of **its choosing**. It assumes that its forces will operate in **permissive environments**-that adversaries will be **unable to contest** its **freedom of movement** in any domain. It assumes that **any quantitative advantage** that an adversary may possess will be **overcome** by its own **superior ability** to **evade** detection, **penetrate** enemy defenses, and **strike targets**. And it assumes that U.S. forces will suffer **few losses** in combat.

These **assumptions** have led to a force built around relatively **small numbers** of **large**, **expensive**, and **hard-to-replace** systems that are optimized for moving undetected close to their targets, shooting a limited number of times but with extreme precision, and communicating with impunity. Think stealth aircraft flying right into downtown Belgrade or Baghdad. What's more, systems such as these depend on **communications**, **logistics**, and **satellite networks** that are almost **entirely defenseless**, because they were designed under the **premise** that no adversary would ever be able to **attack them.**

This military enterprise and its underlying suppositions are being called into question. For the past two decades, while the United States has focused on **fighting wars** in the **Middle East**, its competitors-especially **China**, but also **Russia**-have been dissecting its way of war and **developing** so-called anti-access/area-denial (or A2/AD) capabilities to **detect U.S. systems** in **every domain** and **overwhelm them** with large salvos of precision fire. Put simply, U.S. rivals are fielding **large quantities** of **multimillion-dollar weapons** to destroy the United States' **multibillion-dollar military** systems.

China has also begun work on **megaprojects** designed to **position it** as the **world leader** in **artificial intelligence** and other advanced technologies. This undertaking is not exclusively military in its focus, but every one of these **advanced-technology megaprojects** has **military applications** and benefits the **People's Liberation Army** under the doctrine of "**military-civil fusion**." Whereas the U.S. military still largely treats its data like engine exhaust-a **useless byproduct**-China is moving with **authoritarian zeal** to stockpile its data like **oil**, so that it can power the **autonomous** and **intelligent** military systems it sees as **critical** to **dominance** in **future warfare**.

The United States' position, **already dire**, is **rapidly deteriorating**. As a 2017 report from the rand Corporation concluded, "U.S. forces could, under plausible assumptions, lose the **next war** they are **called upon to fight**." That same year, General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sounded the alarm in stark terms: "In **just a few years**, if we do not **change** the **trajectory**, we will **lose** our qualitative and quantitative **competitive advantage**."

The **greatest danger** for the United States is the **erosion of conventional deterrence**. If leaders in **Beijing** or **Moscow** think that they might **win a war** against the United States, they will run **greater risks** and **press their advantage**. They will take actions that steadily undermine the United States' commitments to its allies by casting doubt on whether Washington would really send its military to defend the Baltics, the Philippines, Taiwan, or even Japan or South Korea. They will try to **get their way** through **any means necessary**, from coercive diplomacy and economic extortion to meddling in the domestic affairs of other countries. And they will steadily harden their **spheres of influence**, turning them into areas ever more **hospitable** to **authoritarian ideology**, **surveillance states**, and **crony capitalism**. In other words, they will try, as the military strategist Sun-tzu recommended, to "win without fighting."

**And key to FinTech strength.**

**Loo ’18** – Associate Professor at BU Law [Rory Van; Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law and Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project; 2018; "Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech"; UCLA Law Review; https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/uclalr65&div=7&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals; accessed 8-18-2021]

C. International Competitiveness

Less **efficient** and **innovative** U.S. financial services are problematic not only in **isolation**, but also from an **international perspective**. Scholars and regulators have inconclusively debated whether banks need to be big to maintain their international competitiveness. 12' Less well-recognized is how a lack of **domestic competition** may undermine U.S. financial firms' global competitiveness. Foreign financial firms may gain an **edge** by being subject to greater competition in their home markets, thereby being **forced to innovate** more and operate leanly. This creates two potential problems. First, reduced domestic competitiveness may make the United States **less able** to enter foreign markets. The U.S. economy has **benefited** in recent years from billions of dollars in revenues **earned abroad** by Google and other leading digital companies. 126 Given the growing portion of the global economy taken up by finance, the fintech lag could constitute a **large-scale missed opportunity** for U.S. firms to strengthen the economy by **bringing in revenues** earned abroad.

Second, in the long term, American financial firms may become **more vulnerable** to international competition even in **domestic markets**. Although U.S. licenses can shield banks from foreign fintech challengers today, distributed **ledger** technologies may change this. Americans are already **increasingly using** Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other unregulated virtual currencies based on blockchain technology.127 Much is unknown about how such technologies will develop, and the trust offered by a governmentally overseen financial system may prove difficult to replicate. 128 If, however, an era of **wide-open** global finance arrives, U.S. financial institutions could find themselves **suddenly exposed** to international competition as never before. Without U.S. regulators to **insulate** them, U.S. financial institutions made soft by lesser competition would be more prone to lose **significant market share** to foreign financial institutions than they would be if domestic markets were more **competitive**.

**Key to sanctions**

**Harrell and Rosenberg 19** – Peter E. Harrell is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security; former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions at the U.S. State Department. Elizabeth Rosenberg is a senior fellow and director and director of the Energy, Economics, and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.

Peter E. Harrell and Elizabeth Rosenberg, “Economic Dominance, Financial Technology, and the Future of U.S. Economic Coercion,” *Center for a New American Security*, 2019, pp. 25-26, http://files.cnas.org.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/CNAS-Report-Economic\_Dominance-final.pdf.

**Developments in fin**ancial **tech**nology also **have the potential to affect the availability and strength of coercive economic measures** over the longer term. The movement to develop **blockchain-based, decentralized payments platforms and** new digital **currencies** or tokenized assets that feature anonymity **can undermine** the strength of **coercive economic measures**. However, **fin**ancial **tech**nology **developments**, such as the development of artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) compliance technologies, also **present potential means to better detect and stop evaders and avoiders of U.S. economic coercion** throughout global chains of financial interconnectivity.

**Fin**ancial **tech**nologies are not themselves the drivers of potential future changes to the sources of coercive economic leverage. However, they may **enable foreign governments to** develop better tools to **insulate transactions from U.S. jurisdiction**. And, regardless of the actions of foreign governments as they spread commercially, they may help evaders duck U.S. coercive economic power in limited but meaningful ways. **Conversely, new AI/ML or other technologies may help U.S. policymakers implementing economic coercion** to better do their job.

Financial technology can be a facilitator of rapid transformation in the financial services sector. Importantly, financial technology developments will not happen just in the United States; a number of other countries, from China to Singapore to Switzerland, are promoting themselves as financial technology leaders. There is no guarantee that financial technology innovators and investors will be centered in the United States in the future—which represents a vulnerability to U.S. economic prominence.

Maintaining U.S. Leverage

**The extent to which the U**nited **S**tates **will maintain coercive economic leverage** in a world where financial technology disrupts aspects of the traditional financial architecture **will depend** to a significant degree **on the extent to which U.S. firms**, and large global firms, continue to **play a dominant role in the development of the technology**. To put it bluntly, a blockchain-based clearing mechanism that enables trade between foreign countries without financial transactions touching the dollar would likely undermine U.S. leverage if the technology were developed and operated by a foreign company that had no need to adhere to U.S. law. **The U**nited **S**tates **would maintain** at least some **leverage if the technology were developed** or operated **by a U.S. company** obliged to adhere to U.S. sanctions, technology-export restrictions, and other relevant laws, or a foreign company with significant U.S. exposure.

**Key to Iran**

**Morrison 21** --- Master of Arts of Political Science, University of Waterloo.

Kallen, 2021, “Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Non-proliferation: A Comparative Study of North Korea and Iran, “University of Waterloo, Fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts, https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/16666/Morrison\_Kallen%20.pdf?sequence=3

Economic sanctions have been successful in stopping Iran from **pursuing their nuclear program thus far**. Iran has conceded multiple times to the United States and the international community to halt the **enrichment of uranium** and the advancement of their nuclear program. The most notable example of Iran’s concessions has been the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in which Iran agreed to halt and greatly reduce their nuclear program in return for substantial easing of economic sanctions. The second criteria has been met as Iran’s economy has significantly worsened due to continued economic pressure from the United States and the international community. Iran’s economy has **significantly worsened** due to **continued economic pressure** from the United States and the international community. Continued economic pressure has been **paramount** to bringing Iran to the negotiating table. While the United States and its regional allies do pose a military threat to Iran, that is **unlikely a sufficient factor** in dissuading Iran.

We have established that the level of political contestation in the targeted countries, their economic and security vulnerabilities, and the degree of international cooperation are important factors in determining if economic sanctions are effective at limiting nuclear proliferation. In Iran’s case the regime, while authoritarian, allows for limited **political contestation**. The general public gets to elect the president (even if candidates are handpicked by the supreme leader). Iranians have been able to protest against the government. One goal of economic sanctions is to **galvanize the general public** against the government and their policy decisions. Iranians have indeed been frustrated by the sanctions and **voiced their discontent** with the government policies targeted by the sanctions.

Iran’s international environment is also conductive for economic sanctions to be effective. Iran is a regional power with an impressive arsenal of missiles and extensive network of proxy forces. Therefore, nuclear weapons are not imperative for Iran’s defence. On the other end, Iran’s economy is largely based on oil and gas exports. **Integration** into the global market is very important for Iranians and a **vital source of revenue for the government**. Economic sanctions have hurt the Iranian economy and therefore have **hurt Iranians**. The **economic squeeze** has brought **Iran to the negotiating table** in the past and **will likely do so in the future**. The international approach to Iran has been encompassing with the European Union and the United Kingdom taking a common stand with the United States in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Even after the United States left the JCPOA the EU and UK have attempted to develop mechanisms to provide Iran with economic incentives to keep Iran abiding to the JCPOA. Even though China has given Iran an economic lifeline there is tension within Iran over concerns of becoming too economically dependent on China.

**Israel preempts---great power war**

**Scheinman 18** – Security Studies Chair, Nat’l War College; Nuclear Nonprolif Rep. for Obama

Adam M. Scheinman, What if Iran leaves the NPT?, 8 June 2018, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/06/what-if-iran-leaves-the-npt/>

Not to diminish the immensity of North Korea’s nuclear challenge, but Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT carries weightier risks. It would likely mean that Iran’s Supreme Leader had given the green light to an Iranian nuclear weapon, opening the floodgates to NPT withdrawals by other Arab states—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt head that list. These and possibly other Sunni governments, none of whom can rely on a major power for defense, may conclude that they require their own nuclear weapon to check Iran’s rise. The Saudis are very clear and public on this point.

More immediately, Israel may feel compelled to **strike** Iranian nuclear facilities **before** they become fully **operational**. This raises the specter of a **regional war** that may **draw in** **several** of the **nuclear weapon states**—the **United States, the UK, France, and Russia**—and reshape the Middle East in ways we cannot predict. Whether the NPT could survive such a shock is another unknown.

**First, the defense –**

## Case

**1NC**

**First the defense –**

1. **Stiegler’s arguments are dependent on factual claims for which he has no evidence. Give no credit to claims without clear warrants and grounding. That also means you should apply an epistemically skeptical filter to random assertions of unsustainability – Especially if we win indicts of the underlying theory or a proximate internal link to an impact.**

**Gratton**, assistant professor of philosophy at the university of San Diego, 8/4/**2010**

(Peter, “Taking Care of Youth and the Generations,” <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24441-taking-care-of-youth-and-the-generations/>)

For those whose attention is waning, Internet consumers that you are, let me cut to the chase: Stiegler is right to attend to the need to reinvigorate "deep attention," but this work itself shows **superficial attention to the myriad issues under discussion**. For example, he argues, "the United States suffers … massively from attention deficit disorder," which both sets up much of his analysis and is demonstrably wrong.[2] He also cites several times the number of hours of media the average American consumes, and then simply presumes that this results in lowered "attention" spans.[3] Following the chain of argument, he then claims that such inattentiveness inexorably leads to rising levels of "juvenile" delinquency. Thus, the future is dim indeed, as I suppose these "incivil," "restless" masses have their own children, and the script of Mike Judge's film Idiocracy (2006) plays itself out. **Yet rates of** such "**delinquency**" in Western Europe and the United States **are down precipitously** over the last twenty years (definitional claims aside),[4] **while at the same time literacy rates continue to go up** (not of minor pertinence here),[5] just as the threshold has been crossed, according to Stiegler, between televisual technologies (movies and TV) and "numerical" programming (computers, cell phones, etc.). **Perhaps the main victim here of televisual culture is Stiegler himself**, **who seems to have simply taken for granted media reports about AD/HD**, **showing little evidence for any research on his own**, which I suppose has the upshot of providing an indirect proof for the problem he describes. He rehashes truisms about the rising levels of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (AD/HD) without noting the vast differences among the many "attention deficit" disorders, or that it involves neurological processes besides those related to temporal retention; nor does he seem to have spent time with sufferers of AD/HD, who would quickly belie a number of his assumptions. He seems not to have thought at all about the historicity of "mental" illnesses and the question of when they could ever be said to arise, not a small point when claiming that AD/HD is wholly contemporary (190). Moreover, Stiegler seems not to have considered that there may be anything other than technological reasons for the rise of AD/HD, not least that we are paying more attention to attention: isn't this attention paid to attention problems itself a sign that, perhaps, "our" civilization is not wholly inattentive yet? That perhaps our problem, given the amount of drugs dispensed for AD/HD, is precisely because we continue, at all costs, to want to fit children into the disciplinary modes he argues Foucault had wrongly focused on, or simply for the reasons of creating a market, thus literally paying attention? That perhaps, for these reasons, we are paying too much attention to attention, to having our kids and adults sit still and face foreword in the types of classrooms Stiegler argues for? At the least, **in a book that admonishes the masses**, **the** "**I don't-give-a-damners**," **for not performing Enlightenment self-critique**, **these questions should be addressed**.

1. **Stiegler’s lack of specificity provides clear reasons to presume their method fails and prioritize questions like how we might effectuate it, i.e. via antitrust!**

Richard **Beardsworth 10**, professor of political philosophy at the american university of paris and is director of its research center (international politics, economics, and public policy), “Technology and Politics: A Response to Bernard Stiegler”, cultural politics volume 6. issue 2, pp 181-199

My summary of the distinction between Marxist materialism and Stiegler's materialism could be contested. It is certainly too starkly put. It nevertheless underscores, for me, the following. Stiegler reads political economy in terms of technology and the technical support. I suggest that, as a result: (1) a certain **specificity** of the economic **is lost** in the technological reading; and (2) this loss has important implications for how one conceives political adoption of contemporary $ capitalist forms. In his manifesto-like Pour une nouvelle critique de l'économie critique, Stiegler rightly laments the lack of economic thought in recent critical thought (2009: 28-9). "Contemporary [critical] philosophy speaks little of the economy [...] as if still haunted by the supposed economism of Marxism" (2009: 29). Stiegler does not look, however, to see how critical political economy may be evolving in the fields of international economics and politics In order to re-address the former from within critical thought. Rather, he emphasizes that the correct response to this absence in philosophical discourse consists in re-inventing Marx's critique of political economy through technology and a constitutive understanding of the technical support (2009: 21, 28, 31, 52). Despite the interest of Stiegler's approach, this response avoids the important objects of political economy. Let me show, schematically, how and why. Stiegler holds to the Marxist theory of the tendential decline in the rate of profit. Marx's argument is well-known (see Marx 1976, Part 7, Chapter 25: "The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation"). With an increase in fixed capital (technology), there is an increase in productivity (more units of x good produced per hour) and, overtime, less hours of exploitable labor. Following the labor theory of value, Marx argues that, with fewer labor-hours, there is less exploitable surplus-value. Despite counter-acting measures (industrial reserve army, capitalist expansion, mergers, etc.), the rate of profit therefore decreases tendentially, until a systemic crisis either overthrows capitalist social relations or produces a new form of them. For Stiegler, twentieth-century capital accumulation (under conditions of the decline in the rate of profit) is increasingly organized through exploitation of the consumer (2009: 41-2). It is, therefore, less the producer than the consumer who is today alienated for the sake of capital accumulation. Indeed, Stiegler provocatively suggests that contemporary consumer society is made up of a "generalized proletariat" alienated from social determinations of life (2009: 48). This switch from the producer to the consumer is effected in the following terms. Capitalism counter-acts the decline in the rate of profit by relentlessly appropriating the contemporary externa I ization of (technical) memory. As a consequence, all forms of knowledge and memory become short-circuited by the contemporary "generalisation of hypermnesic technologies" (Stiegler 2009:51). The nineteenth-century condition of thealienated laborer, unable to objectify himself in industrial technology, becomes that of the contemporary consumer expropriated from the possibility of digesting and synthesizing at leisure the market-led networks of discrete, digitalized memory (2009: 45-51). For Stiegler, accordingly, the present financial and economic crises confirm that decline in the rate of profit has not been overcome (as neoliberals believe) and that the intense model of consumerism based on the hypermnesic technologies has critical limits: social disorientation and de-motivation (2009: 52-7). Against this general "misery of spirit," technics becomes for Stiegler "the major stake" of "political struggle" (2009: 52). Marxist-inspired critique thereby regains its practical vocation as a critical philosophy of technology. It seeks to slow down and synthesize, for individual and collective process of individuation, the short-term horizon of contemporary technical supports. The (Greek) Platonic fear that memory is lost through its externalization upon supports has become, in other words, generalizable under conditions of cognitive capitalism (2009: 44). Much of this reconfiguration of Marx is dependent on Freudian libidinal economy. I will turn to it in the next section. First, I argue that this reading of our contemporary condition is too Greek and misses the requirements of political economy as a result. (It is also suspect from a Derridean perspective since it increasingly understands the pharmakon of the new technologies in ambivalent, rather than aporetic terms, but I leave this appraisal to a deconstructionist.) As is well-known, classical political economy emerges as an autonomous object of study with the separation of the economy from the social whole under processes of modernization. Land, labor, and capital become commodities identified by their price on the market. Economics breaks out of the discipline of moral philosophy and, under the initial name of political economy, it becomes the science that studies general tendencies of individual and collective supply and demand, within the institution of the market, on the basis of explicit anthropological assumptions (rational agency, utilitarian understandingof preferences, etc.). This science has traversed so far three epochs: neoclassical, Keynesian and Neo-Keynesian, and "neoliberal."4 We are undergoing today a fourth moment: a synthesis of neoliberal and Keynesian economics at the global level which will strive to regulate an increasingly integrated—and therefore increasingly unstable—financial and commercial world economy. Now, for Stiegler, the question of technics is a Greek question because the relation between the human and the technical is explicitly posed by the Greeks, and any thinking on technology necessarily works within this Greek framework.5 Whatever one makes of this thesis technologically speaking, the question of the modern and contemporary autonomy of the economic from the social whole is nevertheless not Greek. With the end of the Cold War, with increasing trans-border activity of capital, goods, and, to a much lesser extent, labor, capital comes to determine the terms in which the allocation of scarce resources is made. **Capital becomes**, that is, **general, and there is** for the foreseeable future **no alternative to it**.6 All human beings live within the system of capital, whatever the particular node they live on, or conjunction they make with it. This system is highly unstable and dissymmetrical with immense imbalances in equality, natural resource distribution, financial assets, and terms of trade. **With no alternative to capital, a revolutionary politics is no longer tenable**. The ethical question driving political innovation has, consequently, to be worked out in terms of universally coordinated, but locally determined equilibriums between growth, sustainability, and equity. Given economic interdependence and the necessity of large transfers of technology and wealth from the developed world to the developing world in the context of climate change, effective financial regulation, economic coordination, and staggered development present the right strategies to tame the excesses of neoliberal global capitalism. Whether these strategies are feasible or not is at present an open question given recent government failure to regulate risk-taking and the evident dilemma, for developing countries, between the need for curtailed energy use, on the one hand, and industrialization and exit from poverty, on the other. Now, whatever our answers to these large questions, the political question today—'who are we?'—can only be appraised if the political economy of a globalized world becomes the direct object of critical attention. Only by foregrounding this object and its dilemmas will one have any chance of critical purchase on the political challenges ahead. In this context, Stiegler's foregrounding of technology to promote a new critique of political economy is decisive in purpose and tone, important in detail, but misplaced in general intent. Stiegler is right to stress again the pertinence of the economy for critical thought after "the supposed economism of Marxism" (2009: 29). His technologically trained focus on the alienated consumer is important within the cognitive dimension of contemporary capitalism and debt-led growth. But, if he is concerned to show, as a philosopher, the general lines of a re-invented critical political economy, his object and attention need to be much larger than his "Greek" framework affords. **Since there is no systemic alternative to capitalism at this moment in history**, the question of political economy is one of whether effective regulation of capitalism is possible or not for the world as a whole In this regard, I fear that Stiegler's rhetorical logic of excess testifies to a straightforward shift of Marxist terminology (from producer to consumer) rather than a reinvention of Marxism's object (political economy). I say this despite the deep interest in understanding cognitive capitalism and consumerism through Stiegler's categories. To take a few examples from only the last pages of Pour une nouvelle critique de l'économie politique: we are witnessing the "extreme disenchantment of the world" (2009: 88), a "generalized proletariat [of consumption]" (89), the "disappearance of the middle classes" (89), the "destruction" of social association (87), and "lawless and faithless" elites of capitalism (88). This logic of excess ignores the need today to make small distinctions, under the canopy of political regulation, within the world as a whole. The art of politics today is the prudential art of making critical distinctions within an economy of the same. "**Critical philosophy" may wish to eschew such distinctions, but it does so at its practical peril when there is no alternative to capitalism**, and when, just as importantly, the mid-term horizon is global coordination of a world economy under circumstances of economic imbalance, energy-crisis, and poverty. The political questions today are therefore: "what kind of regulation of capitalism is ethically and empirically appropriate?"; "at what level is it appropriate?"; and "what instance should and can decide?". These are vast and difficult questions for philosophy, political science, and economics: they will occupy minds and bodies for a longtime to come. It is my belief that, within these questions and their distinctions, an engaged philosophy (which Stiegler rightly advocates) has an important role to play. A generalized technological reading of Marx creates in this context important cultural work; but it does not give itself the terms of a contemporary critique of political economy.

1. **Neoliberalism isn’t a monolith – their AFF is a terrible response to proposed market reforms that are key to solve our impacts.**

**Bryant**, Professor of Philosophy – Collin College, **‘12**

(Levi, “We’ll Never Do Better Than a Politician: Climate Change and Purity,” May 11, https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/well-never-do-better-than-a-politician-climate-change-and-purity/)

It is quite true that it is the system of global capitalism or the market that has created our climate problems (though, as Jared Diamond shows in Collapse, other systems of production have also produced **devastating climate problems**). In its insistence on profit and expansion in each economic quarter, markets as currently structured provide no brakes for environmental destructive actions. The system is itself pathological.

However, **pointing this out** and deriding market based solutions **doesn’t get us very far**. In fact, such a response to proposed market-based solutions is downright **dangerous** and **irresponsible**. The fact of the matter is that 1) we currently live in a market based world, 2) there is not, in the foreseeable future an **alternative system** on the horizon, and 3), above all, **we need to do something now**. We can’t afford to **reject interventions** simply because they don’t meet our **ideal conceptions** of how things should be. We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out **does not entail** that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to **grapple with the world** that is actually there before us.

It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible. The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power, though he has gotten better.

I do not wish to denounce others and dismiss their claims on these sorts of grounds. As a Marxist anarchists, I do believe that we should fight for the creation of an alternative hominid ecology or social world. I think that the call to commit and fight, to put alternatives on the table, has been one of the most powerful contributions of thinkers like Zizek and Badiou. If we don’t commit and fight for alternatives those alternatives will never appear in the world. Nonetheless, **we still have to grapple** with the world we find ourselves in. And it is here, in my encounters with some Militant Marxists, that I sometimes find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that they are unintentionally **aiding and abetting** the **very things they claim to be fighting**. In their refusal to become impure, to work with situations or assemblages as we find them, to sully their hands, they end up **reproducing** the very system they wish to topple and change. Narcissistically they get to sit there, **smug** in their superiority and purity, while everything continues as it did before because they’ve refused to become politicians or engage in the difficult concrete work of assembling human and nonhuman actors to render another world possible. As a consequence, they occupy the position of Hegel’s beautiful soul that denounces the horrors of the world, celebrate the beauty of their soul, while **depending on those horrors** of the world to sustain their own position.

To engage in politics is to engage in networks or ecologies of relations between humans and nonhumans. To engage in ecologies is to descend into networks of causal relations and feedback loops that you cannot completely master and that will modify your own commitments and actions. **But there’s no other way,** there’s no way around this, and we do need to act now.

1. **The death drive thesis is outdated**

**Smith**, Director of the Critical Transdisciplinary Research Program and Editor at Heathwood Institute and Press, **‘3/22/17**

(Robert C., “An Alternative Conception of Social Pathology,” in *Society and Social Pathology*, palgrave, pg. 74-75, \*language modified)

Aside from the question of social pathology, at the heart of this book is also the issue of subject development. This involves questions of how a human being develops—or how a child changes during the course of his/ her growth (Litowitz 1999)—and how social conditions, positive or negative, affect that development. “Every psychoanalytic theory from Freud’s earliest models to the latest post-Freudian versions” **attempt to capture a theory of development** in some way (Litowitz 1999). Freud’s theories claim to describe universal developmental stages, which do not depend upon specific environmental responses, cultural or social or otherwise (Litowitz 1999). Thus significant emphasis is **placed on biology** in the development of the psyche (Moritsugu et al. 2016).

Outside of certain movements within CT and more traditional pockets of psychoanalysis, Freud’s instinct theory and biological model is generally **considered highly questionable** (Benja eld 2010; Benjamin 1988; Black and Mitchell 2016; Blum and Hoffman 2016; Gomez 1997; Buirski and Kottler 2007; Rogers 1951, 1959; Schneider et al. 2001; Shane et al. 1997; Simanowitz and Pearce 2003). In fact, Freud’s theories in general are being increasingly challenged, or shown as **not possible to prove** (Dvorsky 2013). Many have either already discarded his theories as postulation without scientic validation or have used them as guidance knowing they are awed or incredibly abstract. As Axel Honneth put it:

Only dogmatism can today still ~~blind one to~~[conceal] the fact that a string of premises of Freudian theory have [...] **become highly questionable.** Developments in **infant research**, in **developmental psychology** generally, but also in **evolutionary biology**, have cast doubt on central and basic assumptions of the psychoanalytic view of young children. (Honneth 2009, p. 126)

Even contemporary theories of the unconscious, which many have labelled one of Freud’s greatest accomplishments, are continuously seeking to establish differentiation from Freudian theory (Romand 2012), rooting their concepts in Gustav Fechner’s earlier hypotheses. Additionally, while efforts at reforming classical Freudian theory have been attempted by the likes of Jacques Lacan and his contemporary followers, which is a popular movement in psychoanalysis today, particularly or primarily in theory and through the work of Slavoj Žižek, this too can be argued for different reasons to be deeply inadequate when weighed against more **up-to-date cross-disciplinary research programme** (Smith 2013).

Indeed, from a wide survey of literature, and from a discussion with different **clinical practitioners and psychotherapists**, it is clear that Fromm’s challenging Freudian **instinct theory** is, in present times, a less than controversial course of critique. This lends to the belief that when reading Freud today, as Fisher and Greenberg (1996) argue, what is required is a significant amount of nuance. His theory should be evaluated, they claim, in terms of specific hypotheses rather than as a whole (Fisher and Greenberg 1996; also cited in McLeod 2013). One reason for this, quite simply, has to do with the many “unresolved contradictions in Freud’s writings”, including what has been summarized as an unevenly developed system of ideas that are not integrated into a logical, systematic whole (Boag 2014).

**Scaling up psychoanalysis fails for both SOLVENCY and DESCRIPTIVE POWER**

**Sharpe**, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, **‘10**

(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 186)

• So here is the force of the second, methodological component to Žižek’s untenable erasure of the difference between politics and psychoanalysis. By looking at the contemporary world as a contemporary subject–object in need of the theorist’s liberating ‘psychoanalysis’, Žižek is unable to make a series of key sociotheoretical distinctions long recognised in political and socialtheoretical literature on complex societies. • The key one of these, as we saw in ‘Vanishing Mediations’, is the distinction between the lifeworld of subjects (their lived world of meanings wherein a psychoanalytic ideology critique can be highly informative) and the media- steered subsystems – principally the economy- - **whose workings demand an objectifying social- scientific analysis, not a psychoanalytic account.** • The problem Žižek elides, in the words of his own teacher Althusser, is that modern post- traditional societies are a complex totality of ‘relatively autonomous’ instances – in Althusser’s thinking, the economy, the ideological and the political instances. • Then there is the question of which instance or level might be the predominant one in any particular historical regime. One practical consequence of this theoretical observation is that the peoples or potentials that might be either ‘symptomatic’ or particularly vital at one level (say, the ideological level) **may be** either well integrated or wholly **disempowered at the other levels.**

**Second – competition offense – Markets are key to all our shit**

**Posner and Weyl 18** – Eric A. Posner is Kirkland and Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Arthur and Esther Kane Research Chair at the University of Chicago. E. Glen Weyl is an economist and researcher at Microsoft Research New England.

Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, “Epilogue: After Markets?” *Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society*, Princeton University Press 2018, Epub (email [arg5180@gmail.com](mailto:arg5180@gmail.com) for relevant text).

Markets as Miracles

As we saw in chapter 1, many economists who were committed to the market economy also considered themselves “socialists.” Yet in the early twentieth century, socialism became identified with central planning, thanks to the role of Marxism and the French Revolution in inspiring and justifying the economic policies of the Soviet Union. Central planning also received a boost from World War I, where national control of the economy for the purpose of war production was more successful than advocates of laissez-faire could ever have imagined. This led to a heated debate about whether central planning should be used in peacetime as well.

In the popular imagination, central planning could not succeed because it provided individuals with no incentives to work. People needed the prospect of riches, or at least wages, to get them out of bed in the morning. Yet incentives were quite strong in the Soviet Union, stronger, in many ways, than they are in capitalist countries. While there was less chance under Communism to grow rich, any prisoner of the Gulag knew the fate of those who “malingered.”

Another popular argument against central planning was advanced by Nobel Laureate Friedrich Hayek in 1945. Hayek argued that no central planner could obtain information about people’s tastes and productivity necessary to allocate resources efficiently.1 The genius of the market was the way that the price system could, in disaggregated fashion, collect this information from everyone and supply it to those who needed to know it, without the involvement of a government planning board.

A related version of this argument, less well-known than Hayek’s but actually more compelling, was made a few decades earlier. The brilliant economist Ludwig von Mises argued that **the fundamental problem facing socialism was not incentives or knowledge** in the abstract **but communication and computation**.2 To see what Mises meant, consider an illustrative parable proposed by Leonard Read in his 1958 essay, “I, Pencil.” 3

Read **tells the “life story” of a pencil**. Such a simple thing, one would at first think. And yet as **you begin to reflect, you realize the enormously complex layers of thought and planning it would require to make a pencil from scratch**. The wood must be chopped, cut, shaped, polished, and honed. The graphite must be mined, chiseled, and shaped. The ferrule—the collar that connects the wood shaft and the eraser—is an alloy of dozens of metals, each of which must be mined, melted, combined, and reformed. And so forth.

Yet **what is most remarkable about the pencil is not its complexity but the complete lack of understanding that anyone involved in the manufacture of the** eventual **pencil has about any of these steps in the process. The lumberjack knows only that there is a market for his wood** and some price that induces her to buy the needed tools, cut down trees, and sell lumber down the line of production. The lumberjack may never even know that the wood is used for a pencil. **The pencil factory owner knows only where to purchase the needed intermediate materials** and how to run a line assembling them. **The knowledge and planning of the pencil’s creation emerge organically from the process of market relations.**

Now **suppose** that **we were to try to replicate the market relationships with a central planning board**. The board would determine how much wood to chop and when, the number of workers to employ at each stage of production, the correct places and times to produce, ship, and build. Yet, to do this effectively **the board** would have to understand a great many things. It **would have to learn from each of these specialized producers the unique knowledge of her domain of expertise that allows her to earn a living**—for example, whether the lumber would have a more valuable use elsewhere in the economy (to build houses or ships or children’s toys) than as an input for pencils. **Absorbing all this information and constantly receiving and processing the necessary updates to keep abreast of evolving conditions in each of these steps of the process, would overwhelm the capacity of even the most skilled managers.**

And **even if the board** somehow **had an unlimited capacity to absorb this information, it would still have the unmanageable problem of trying to act on this sea of data**. Prices, supply and demand, and production relations in markets arise through a complex interplay of individuals each helping to optimize a tiny part of a broad social process. If, instead, a single board had to plan this entire dance, **it would force a small number of individuals to contemplate an endless sequence of choices and plans. Such elaborate calculations are beyond the capacity of even the most brilliant group of engineers.**

Mises wrote decades before the rise of the fields of computer science and information theory and lacked any way to formalize these intuitive ideas. Many of Mises’s arguments were dismissed by mainstream economists, whose increasingly narrow mathematical approach to the field Mises disdained. Mises’s critics, including Oskar Lange, Fred Taylor, and Abba Lerner, argued that the market mechanism was but one of many ways (and far from the most efficient way) to organize an economy. They viewed the economy purely mathematically, rather than computationally, and saw no difficulty in principle with solving a (very large) system of equations relating the supply and demand of various goods, resources, and services.

In a simplified picture of the economy, ordinary people perform dual functions as producers (workers, suppliers of capital, etc.) and consumers. As consumers, people have preferences regarding different goods and services. Some people like chocolate, others like vanilla. As producers, they have different talents and capacities. Some people are good at doing math, others at mollifying angry customers. In principle, all we need to do is figure out people’s preferences and their talents, and assign jobs to people who do them best, while distributing the value created by production in the form of goods and services that people really want. Rewards and penalties need to be determined to give people incentives to reveal their preferences and talents, and to ensure that they actually do what they are supposed to do. All of this can be represented mathematically and solved. That’s why **socialist economists viewed the economy as a math problem the solution of which only required a computer**.

Yet the later development of the theory of computational and communication complexity vindicated Mises’s insights. What computational scientists later realized is that **even if managing the economy were “merely” a problem of solving a large system of equations, finding such solutions is far from the easy task that socialist economists believed**. In an incisive computational analysis of central planning, statistician and computer scientist Cosma Shalizi illustrates how utterly impossible “solving” a modern economy would be for a central planning board. As Shalizi notes in his essay, “In the Soviet Union, Optimization Problem Solves You,” **the computer power it takes to solve an economic allocation problem increases more than proportionately in the number of commodities in the economy**.4 In practical terms, this means that in any large economy, central planning by a single computer is impossible.

To make these abstract mathematical relationships concrete, Shalizi considers an estimate by Soviet planners that, **at the height of Soviet economic power in the 1950s, there were about 12 million commodities** tracked in Soviet economic plans. To make matters worse, this figure does not even account for the fact that a ripe banana in Moscow is not the same as a ripe banana in Leningrad, and moving it from one place to the other must also be part of the plan. But even were there “merely” 12 million commodities, **the most efficient known algorithms for optimization, running on the most efficient computers available today, would take roughly a thousand years to solve such a problem exactly once**. It can even be proven that **a modern computer could not achieve even a reasonably “approximate” solution**—and, of course, today there are far more goods, services, transport choices, and other factors that would go into the problem than there were in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Yet somehow **the market miraculously cuts through this computational nightmare**.

Markets as Parallel Processors

But all of this raises a question. If the problem is so hard to solve, how is it possible for the market to solve it? Consider Lange’s quote from our epigraph.5 The market is just a set of rules enforced by the government—not much different from a computer algorithm, although a very complex one. It’s true that no single person invented the market. Yet the rules of the market are well understood, and economists are constantly telling people to implement them. Imagine that a new country is created, and its leaders ask a western economist how best to create an economy. The economist will tell them how to set up a market—the rules of contract and property law, for example. (Indeed, economists have been running around the halls of government of developing countries and the floors of start-ups for decades doing just this.) Aren’t the economists just supplying a kind of computer program to the leaders, who by implementing it are engaging in a style of centralized planning?

To understand how the market solves the “very large system of equations,” you need to know the key ideas of distributed computing and parallel processing. In these systems, complicated calculations that no one computer could perform are divided into small parts that can be performed in parallel by a large number of computers distributed across different geographic locations. Distributed computing and parallel processing are best known for their role in the development of “cloud computing,” but their greatest application has gone unnoticed: the market economy itself.

While the human brain is wired differently from a computer, computational scientists estimate that a single human mind has a computational capacity roughly ten times greater than the most powerful single supercomputer at the time of this writing.6 The combined capacity of all human minds is therefore tens of billions of times greater than this most powerful present-day computer. **The “market” is** then in some sense **a giant computer composed of these smaller but still very powerful computers. If it allocates resources efficiently**, it does so **by harnessing and combining their separate capacities**.

Adopting this perspective, we must ask how the market is “programmed” to achieve this outcome. The economy consists of a variety of resources and human capacities at a range of locations, along with a system for transmitting data about these resources among individual human beings. A standard approach in parallel processing is to take information local to one location in, say, a picture or puzzle and assign this to one processor, integrating these inputs on still other processors in a hierarchical fashion. Now apply this image to the economy. In every place, we take one of the computers (humans) available to us and assign it to collect information about that location’s needs and resources and report some parsimonious “compressed” summary of all that data to other computers. For example, there might be a hierarchical arrangement of computers, with those responsible for particular locations on the ground reporting to a higher “layer” that integrates local areas and then upward from there.

Consider the following example. A person works on a farm and is in charge of ensuring that the farm is productive and that her family is happy. This person sends information about the farm and her family, not in its full richness and complexity, but in broad strokes, to district managers. One manager specializes in understanding the resources that farms need to operate—seeds, fertilizer— while another understands the resources that people living on farms need in order to be happy, including food and clothing. These managers would then aggregate these data and convey them to the next layer, perhaps a national wheat distributor or a regional supplier of products for use on farms. At every level of this chain, some information would need to be lost for the parallel processing to remain parallel and tractable: the farm manager could not detail every way in which a slightly better paved road would help in conveying goods to market or how slightly cleaner water would protect her crops. But at least she could report the largest and most important needs and hope that the loss of information only slightly reduces the efficiency of the resulting solution.

**This arrangement has a flavor of central planning but also resembles a market economy. People specialize in different parts of the production chain and operate under limited information, yet are able to coordinate their behavior** because the information takes a certain form. While people are experts on local conditions, they know little about economic conditions elsewhere. They know that grain prices are high and tractor prices are low, but not why this is the case. When they buy a tractor or sell grain, they don’t tell the vendor or purchaser their life story, all the conditions on their farm, and so forth. They just place an order or offer so much grain at the going price.

This “price system” thus greatly simplifies communication between different parts of the economy. In fact, economists have shown that prices are the minimum information that a farmer needs to plan her operations effectively. So long as every important way that the farm could benefit or draw down resources from the outside world has a price attached to it, this is all the information the farmer needs to make economic decisions. Any greater information would be a waste, from a purely economic efficiency perspective, though it might be interesting from time to time to develop personal relationships. Conversely, **if** these **prices were not available, there would be no way for a farmer to know whether it pays to use new tractors or rely instead on more labor**, nor would she know how many seeds to plant for next season. The farmer without such prices could easily produce too little or waste resources on a tractor that could be better used for more labor, seed, or even consumption.

In this sense, **prices are the “minimum” information necessary for rational economic decision-making**.7 **No other system of distributed computing can be equally productive and yet require less communication.**

**Markets elegantly exploit distributed human computational capacity**. In doing so **they allocate resources in ways that no present computer could match**. Von Mises was right that **central planning by a group of experts cannot replace the market system**. But his argument was mistakenly taken as implying that the market is “natural” rather than a human-created program for managing economic resources. In fact, there is nothing natural about market institutions. Human beings create markets—in their capacity as judges, legislators, administrators, and even private business people who frequently set up organizations that create and manage markets.

**Markets are powerful computers, but whether they produce the greatest good or not depends on how they are programmed**. We advocate “Radical Markets” because we believe that in the present stage of technological and economic development, when cooperation has grown too large to be managed by moral economies, the market is the appropriate computer to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number. If we see it as such, **we can fix the bugs in the market’s code and enable it to generate more wealth that is distributed more fairly**.

By sharpening our understanding of the role and value of markets, the computational analogy clarifies our claim that the solutions we propose are based on extending the reach of markets. The COST on wealth radicalizes markets as it puts greater responsibility on individuals to articulate their values and gives them greater ability to claim things they value highly. QV does the same in the political sphere. Our ideas on migration give individuals more scope for determining the best path for where they live and work. Our proposals on antitrust and data valuation break up centralized power and place greater responsibility on individuals and small firms to compete, innovate, and make rational economic choices to allow for the distributed computation of optimal economic allocations. But all these proposals raise the question: if the market is just a computer program that harnesses the power of individual human intellects, will it still be necessary as computer power increases?

**Third – Cap great**

**Financialization arg is wrong – The solution is not wholesale rejection but a recommitment to ensuring finance is socially efficient – history proves it’s a massive boon for development which is good**

**Storm 18** - a Senior Lecturer (Economics of Technology and Innovation) at the Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management of Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands

Servaas, “Financialization and Economic Development: A Debate on the Social Efficiency of Modern Finance,” Development and Change: Volume49, Issue2 FORUM 2018 March 2018 Pages 302-329, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dech.12385

The global financial crisis has been followed by **10 dire years of economic stagnation**, high and rising inequalities in income and wealth, historically unprecedented levels of indebtedness, and mounting uncertainty about jobs and incomes in most nations. The crisis conditions crystallized into a steadily increasing popular dissatisfaction with the political and economic status quo of those supposedly ‘left behind by (financial) globalization’; a dissatisfaction which amplified into a ‘groundswell of discontent’ — to use the exact words of the IMF's Managing Director Christine Lagarde (2016). Angry and anxious electorates were transformed by demagogues into election‐winning forces, as the British Brexit vote, Trump's (2016) and Erdogan's (2017) election victories in the US and Turkey, and recent political changes (toward authoritarianism) in Brazil, Egypt, the Philippines and India all attest. Secular stagnation and political instability are feeding a widespread sense that capitalism, as a historical phenomenon, is now in a critical condition — and to some the question is no longer whether but how capitalism will end (see Streeck, 2014). **This is not the question** of the present Debate, however, which instead asks how and why the global political economy morphed from post‐WWII ‘mixed’ industrial capitalism to a neoliberal ‘rentiers’ delight’, and **how to confront the** Panglossian logic and arguments used by (**financial) economists** to **legitimize the financialized order** as the ‘**best of all possible worlds’**.

Taken together, the 10 contributions in this Debate **lay to rest the Hayekian claim** that **unregulated market‐based finance** **is socially efficient** — the macro‐ and microeconomic impacts of the rise to dominance of financial markets on capital accumulation, growth and distribution have overwhelmingly been found to be deleterious (Epstein). Market‐based finance is no longer funding the real economy (Epstein; Jayadev, Mason and Schröder), but rather engaging in a self‐serving strategy of rent‐seeking (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh; Mader), licensed larceny à la Hildyard (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh; Mader), exchange rate and global stock market speculation (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner), derivatives speculation (Keucheyan; Clapp and Isakson) and collateral mining (Gabor; Lavinas) — asphyxiating economic development in the process. As John Maynard Keynes (1930 1972: 131) wrote in his article ‘The Grand Slump of 1930’, ‘there cannot be a real recovery … until the ideas of lenders and the ideas of productive borrowers are brought together again …. Seldom in modern history has the gap between the two been so wide and so difficult to bridge’. As the Debate articles show, the gap between finance and the real economy may be even wider today than in the 1930s.

**This does not mean**, however, that Schumpeter and Gerschenkron were wrong in calling the **banker the ‘ephor’ of capitalism** and a ‘**phenomenon of development’**. **Finance can positively contribute to economic development**, something which indeed is ‘**almost too obvious for serious discussion’** as Miller wrote, but **only when the ‘ephor’ is ‘governed’** and ‘**directed’ by state regulation** to structure accumulation and distribution into **socially useful directions** (Epstein; Jayadev, Mason and Schröder). The **East Asian miracle** economies prove the point that finance **can be socially efficient** if bankers can be made to work within the ‘**developmental mindset’**, the institutional arrangements and political compulsions of a ‘developmental state’, as argued by Wade. China's recent move to (securities) market‐based finance may be the beginning of the unravelling of its growth miracle (Gabor; see also BIS, 2017). **Rather than letting financial markets discipline** the rest of the economy and the whole of society, finance itself has to be **disciplined by a countervailing social authority** **which governs it** to **act in socially desirable directions**.

One famous account in the Talmud tells about Rabbi Hillel, a great sage, who, when he was asked to explain the Torah in the time that he could stand on one foot, replied: ‘Do not do unto others that which is repugnant to you. Everything else is commentary’. If there is a one‐foot summary of the 10 articles in the Debate, reviewed in this Introduction, it is this: ‘**Finance is a terrible ephor**, but, if **and when domesticated**, **can be turned into a useful servant**. **Everything else is commentary’**.

**4th – AI is k2 fighting antibiotic resistance – the boundaries of rationality means humans will inevitably overprescribe antibiotics BUT AI can manage infections objectively in a way that’s impossible for humans to do**

**Rawson 19** -- National Institute for Health Research Health Protection Research Unit in Healthcare Associated Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance, Imperial College London, London, UK

(Timothy Rawson, 3-25-2019, "Artificial intelligence can improve decision-making in infection management," Nature Human Behaviour, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0583-9)

Antibiotic resistance is an emerging global danger. Reaching responsible prescribing decisions requires the integration of broad and complex information. Artificial intelligence tools could support decision-making at multiple levels, but building them needs a transparent co-development approach to ensure their adoption upon implementation.

Optimal decision-making in healthcare is commonly influenced by the boundary of rationality1. As described by Simon, this concept proposes that irrespective of a decision-maker’s intelligence, their decision making will often be limited by three unavoidable constraints: (i) information available to make decisions is often limited and potentially unreliable; (ii) the human mind has a limited capacity; and (iii) there is only a limited amount of time in which to make a decision1. Therefore, in complex situations an individual will often pursue a course of action that satisfies the minimal requirements necessary to achieve a particular goal rather than an optimal choice, even when attempting to be rational in their decision making.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the use of computer algorithms to mimic human cognitive functions such as learning or problem solving. AI facilitates the analysis of data with a lens that surpasses human capacity through its ability to process data and information, addressing the issue of ‘bounded rationality’. AI is also devoid of behavioural limitations, including unsubstantiated deviation from evidence based guidelines, influence of peers in hierarchical cultural norms, and fatigue2. The computer can learn in an objective manner, providing predictions that are often more accurate than observed in routine practice3. In the last 20 years the concept of AI has grown exponentially, as evidenced in published works: there was a more than six-fold increase in AI-related publications registered in PubMed.gov in the past two decades. It’s necessary to learn from early applications of AI and assess the potential for its future impact to address some of the immediate challenges in healthcare. In particular, how can AI help in situations when the concept of the rational choice has the additional complexity of considering long-term individual and societal harm as well as individual benefit in the short term? As an example, this article will explore the role of AI to support optimal antibiotic decision-making.

AI to optimise antibiotic prescribing

Antibiotic prescribing, whether appropriate or inappropriate, is a driver of antimicrobial resistance4. Antimicrobial resistance is a complex social and biological challenge that reflects many of the problems Simon set out when describing the boundary of rationality1,5. It is also an ideal example of when caring for an individual has immediate and far reaching externalities. A decision made to prescribe an antibiotic affects not only the individual patient, but also individual’s microbiome and society as a whole, through the selection of drug-resistant organisms. Decision making during infection management is a dynamic and often inconsistent process5. There is often a paucity of evidence to support antibiotic prescribing, with heterogeneous, proxy outcome measures used as gold standards. Concerns over high mortality associated with delays in prescribing in conditions such as sepsis, the increasing rate of drug-resistant infections, and lack of robust diagnostics to support dynamic decision-making lead clinicians to overuse antibiotics. This overuse of antibiotics is therefore observed even when there is low likelihood of infection being present and is further demonstrated across different healthcare settings through data on medication errors and the prevalence of healthcare associated infections.

In an attempt to optimise treatment, reduce the inappropriate use of antibiotics, and promote more balanced, socially considerate prescribing, interventions have been put in place to support evidence-based decision-making. These interventions, collectively referred to as antimicrobial stewardship, ultimately are an effort toward behavioural change at the individual and organisational level. Investment in the field has focused on the development of diagnostics to help augment antimicrobial stewardship, but such developments have been piecemeal and isolated from the systems within which they should be embedded to impact behaviour4,5. AI provides the potential to integrate these complex processes and support optimal use of data for evidence-based decision-making.

Factors influencing nonadoption

The development of electronic clinical decision systems to support antibiotic prescribing have been widely explored6. These are computerised programmes that are designed to help healthcare professionals or patients make decisions about healthcare. In other fields, clinical decision support systems (CDSS) have improved the quality and safety of healthcare decisions7. But many of the CDSS focused on antimicrobial stewardship, and more widely in healthcare, are yet to be successfully adopted. Whilst many factors have been cited for adoption failures, it appears largely due to a late consideration of co-design and of the behavioural factors that govern their use6,7. This often leads to the implementation of adynamic systems that lack the flexibility required to seamlessly integrate into practice. A further challenge in the field of infection is the requirement to focus decision support not only on human factors, but also on those of the pathogen, the antibiotic being prescribed in the context of individual polypharmacy, the evolution of resistance, the symbiotic microbiome, and the wider environment.

Future development of AI systems

The global increase in electronic health record utilisation has generated large amounts of routinely available electronic patient and microbiological data that could be utilised to support individualised antimicrobial stewardship. While this access opens up opportunities for advancing applications, the sheer volume of data available will present challenges to identify the most useful information and filter out noise. Training AI to perform data-cleaning functions and to deal with missing data are exciting opportunities. The parallel advances in computer processing capabilities and AI algorithms also present the potential to develop tools for prediction. In the field of infection, **AI may enhance our ability to make individualised treatment decisions,** even when there is a limited evidence base**, whilst also monitoring for unintended consequences of decisions.** However, lessons must be learnt from the current difficulties with promoting adoption of clinical decision support tools.

The development of AI systems in the field of infection is still in its infancy. A range of supervised and unsupervised AI tools have been developed, including causal probabilistic networks and support vector machine classifiers.6,8 These tools have shown high accuracy in predicting infection and recommending appropriate antibiotic therapy6,8. For example, Leibovici and colleagues reported a cluster-randomised control trial of a decision-support tool containing a causal probabilistic network that improved the appropriateness of antibiotic prescribing significantly8.

**Extinction**

**Davies, 8**

(Microbiology and Immunology Prof-University of British Columbia “Resistance redux. Infectious diseases, antibiotic resistance and the future of mankind,” http://www.nature.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/embor/journal/v9/n1s/full/embor200869.html)

For many years, antibiotic-resistant pathogens have been recognized as one of the **main threats to human survival**, as some **experts** predict a return to the **pre-antibiotic era**. So far, national efforts to exert strict control over the use of antibiotics have had limited success and it is not yet possible to achieve worldwide concerted action to reduce the growing threat of multi-resistant pathogens: there are too many parties involved. Furthermore, the problem has not yet really arrived on the radar screen of many physicians and clinicians, as antimicrobials still work most of the time—apart from the occasional news headline that yet another nasty superbug has emerged in the local hospital. Legislating the use of antibiotics for non-therapeutic applications and curtailing general public access to them is conceivable, but legislating the medical profession is an entirely different matter. In order to meet the growing problem of antibiotic resistance among pathogens, the discovery and development of new antibiotics and alternative treatments for infectious diseases, together with tools for rapid diagnosis that will ensure effective and appropriate use of existing antibiotics, are **imperative**. How the health services, pharmaceutical industry and academia respond **in the coming years** will **determine the future** of treating infectious diseases. **This challenge is not to be underestimated**: microbes are **formidable adversaries** and, despite our best efforts, continue to **exact a toll on the human race**.

# 2NC

#### [C]---Accepting norms is the only way to effectively critique – the aff devolves into narcissism and fails at deconstructing oppressive structures

Ruti, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Toronto, ‘15

(Mari, *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics*, Bloomsbury Publishing, pg. 192-195)

What is disturbing here is not so much Butler's appreciation for religion but the crowding out of the secular that accompanies her revival of religious themes. Suddenly there is no breathing space outside of religion—something that is a little difficult for an atheist such as myself to process. The implication is that my secularism is an elaborate ruse or self-deception. If in Butler's earlier theories, then; was no outside of power, now there is no outside of religion. Either way, there is a love of subjection, but with the replacement of power by religion comes the strange notion that there is something laudatory about this subjection. Even though Butler has spent years criticizing Lacan’s concept of the Law of the Father, she now seems to have no problem with God the Father. I admit that this is when Kant starts sounding like my best friend. Indeed, what I see happening in Butler's discourse is **something that happens frequently** in contemporary theory: **in its** eagerness **to formulate the** latest critical paradigm—to reach the ever-so-coveted radical edge I mentioned above—this **theory tends to** vilify **the entity which immediately precedes the new paradigm** even when the entity in question is much less hegemonic than the one it time replaced. In the present instance, because secularism is what immediately preceded the current moment of postsecularism, progressive critics are falling over each other to prove that it was a **tremendous evil**, perhaps even a bigger evil than the religious authority that it replaced. Yet from, say, a secular feminist perspective—which, I concede, is not the only valid feminist perspective—this seems like a hugely conservative curveball thrown into an otherwise progressive game. Again, by this I do not mean to suggest that there is no space for religion in intellectual analysis, even in progressive theory. But—and I suppose this has been my complaint throughout this book—I find the either-or logic which dictates that now that religion is "in," secularism has to be "out," fundamentally flawed. I am willing to entertain the (somewhat strained I idea that God the Father could be turned into a progressive trope. But I am not prepared to give up the advances represented by secularism—including the fact that I, as a woman, am free to have sex outside of matrimony—in order to venerate this trope.

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When I started writing this book, I did not know that end up defending aspects of Enlightenment secularism, let alone a priori normative limits. My background in progressive critical theory predisposed me to be much more interested in antinormative critiques aimed at unearthing the covert functioning of disciplinary power. Completing this hook certainly has not erased this interest. But the more I thought about ethics, the more convinced I became that the categorical rejection of a priori norms—even of the type of 'historical a priori" that Allen advocates—that characterizes the postmetaphysical approaches I have analyzed **is not only theoretically untenable but also** practically unbearable. In this conviction, I found an unexpected ally in Zizek who, in the closing pages of Less Than Nothing, seems to gesture toward something similar when he admits—thereby notably deviating from his usual stance regarding human rights—that even though we must acknowledge that human rights discourses privilege Western individualistic values, **we should not** make the mistake **of thinking that they are “directly and only capitalist ideological masks for domination and exploitation**."30 Indeed, Zizek asserts that this mistake would be even "more dangerous" (LN 1005) than the opposite one of accepting human rights as an instance of value free universality. This is because. Zizek continues, "formal freedom"— which human rights, like other rights-based systems of justice, presumably aspire toward (even if they always fall short of this goal)—"is the only form of appearance (or potential site) of actual freedom.” In other words, freedom cannot become actual without the envelope of formal freedom, which is why Zizek concludes that "if one prematurely abolishes “formal” freedom, one loses also (the potential of) actual freedom" (LN 1006).

These statements are somewhat difficult to reconcile with Zizek’s overall Marxist-Lacanian stance—a stance that valorizes the radical negativity of the ethical act that I analyzed in the previous chapter. Yet they **are compatible** with Zizek's anti-Levinasian defense of the "coldness of justice" that we encountered in Chapter 2. Realizing this, and considering the arguments I have made in this book, I am forced to admit that the conceptual sliding I perceive in Zizek between the negativity of the ethical act and the impartial coldness of justice (or "formal freedom") is not very different from my own vacillation between the Lacanian act (Chapter 4) and cosmopolitan human rights (this chapter). **It in fact seems obvious that both of these approaches**—**revolutionary and rights-based**—**are** necessary **for our** capacity **to think about ethics in the global arena.** This is why I have stressed in my commentary on Butler that I am not bothered by the sudden resurgence of liberal values in her theory but merely by her unwillingness to own up to this resurgence. Zizek does not have much trouble avowing his more Kantian moments. Butler, in contrast, **falls into the category of progressive thinkers who**, as Zizek puts it, **"improvise endlessly on the motif of impossible universality"** (LN 831} at the same time as she, whenever this serves her purposes, falls back on this very universality. It is this aspect of her work that ruffles me.

Undoubtedly a priori norms are often problematic, as is obvious from the painful histories of oppression, exclusion, and marginalization that have accompanied them. But they have also been essential for overcoming such histories, for gaining the kinds of "rights" that have had far-reaching economic, cultural, symbolic, and ideological repercussions. **This is why it seems injudicious to reject them across the board.** Furthermore, I am not even certain that the rejection at a priori norms necessarily decenters the self in quite the way that Butler, among many others, appears to assume. Butler privileges Levinasian relational ethics over Kantian, Habermasian, and other Enlightenment-inspired approaches in part because the latter's respect for a priori norms, in her opinion, leads back to the rationalist, autonomous humanist subject, or at the very least to its contemporary avatar: the neoliberal capitalist subject. **Yet arguably the effect of a priori norms is to** render the subject secondary (**rather than autonomous**): the subject is expected to obey such norms regardless of its self-serving interests. The Kantian categorical imperative, for instance, starts from the premise that how the subject feels—**whether it, for example, regards a given norm as a threat to its capacity to experience pleasure—is** completely irrelevant, to ethical deliberation. We all know that separating feeling from ethics is a rail order. But the relevant point here is that, from the Kantian perspective, the rejection of a prion norms comes across as too convenient, even self-centered and narcissistic, which is why it could easily be interpreted as a symptom of the very neoliberal capitalism that critics such as Butler denounce.

The self-absorbed neoliberal individual, who is used to an endless array of existential possibilities, and who **does not like limitations on her freedom**—including her freedom to buy everything that a decent department store makes available—may be perfectly happy with the idea that she **should not be beholden to norms** that might in some way thwart her ability to move about the world without restriction. From this viewpoint, **one could argue that a priori norms** war against the neoliberal capitalist ethos of unmitigated choice, that they, in a certain sense, "interrupt" the neoliberal subject (and its projects of self-actualization) **just as effectively as the Levinasian-Butlerian other does by introducing within its being “alien"** elements (norms) **that it experiences as constraining**. This is one reason I believe that a priori norms are not a completely preposterous alternative to the relativism that nibbles at the edges of contemporary progressive ethics and that, ironically enough, carries its own violence.

Let me add a final insight about a prion norms that may disrupt our usual lines of ideological allegiance, namely that Zizek's conceptualization of the Lacanian ethical act may tell us something useful about how to keep Allen's "historical a priori" from solidifying into an oppressive status quo. To grasp what I mean, it is necessary to understand a major distinction between Badiou's account of the truth-event on the hand and Zizek’s account of the act on the other. As we have seen, the event and the act both reveal (are supposed to reveal) a "truth" of some kind. But the oncological status of this "truth" is quite different for these two thinkers: if the event, for Badiou, reveals a truth that can be named and incorporated into the new social order that (potentially, through the subject's fidelity to the event) emerges from the ashes of the event, Zizek insists that the truth that arises from the subject's act of negativity has no positive status but, rather, signifies the ultimate failure of meaning as such. That is, while Badiou views the void of the event as containing some sort of legitimate meaning, Zizek views it in a more strictly Lacanian vein, as the "real" of the situation, as an insurmountable impediment to the legitimatization of meaning. This is why Zizek consistently accuses Badiou of downplaying the negative, destructive force of the event: "This, then, is the ultimate difference between Badiou and Lacan: Badiou's starting point is an affirmative project and the fidelity to it; while, for Lacan, the primordial fact is that of negativity (ontologically, the impossibility of the One being One)" (LN 836). **For Zizek, "**naming" the event, as Badiou strives to do. merely establishes a new hegemony—**one that seeks to suppress the disruptive force of negativity percolating beneath every social order (as it also percolates beneath every "coherent" subjectivity**).

# 1NR

## Case

#### Growth’s sustainable.

Rune **Westergård 18**. Entrepreneur, Engineer and Author, founder of the technical consulting company CITEC. 2018. “Real and Imagined Threats.” One Planet Is Enough, Springer International Publishing, pp. 71–80. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-60913-3\_7.

Threatening reports about our ability to create disasters and even exterminate ourselves are not a new idea. A standard example is the British national economist Thomas Malthus in the early 19th century, who predicted that population growth would come to a halt because of starvation. Malthus calculated that the available food in the world couldn’t feed more than one billion people. He extrapolated the development from a still picture of his own time and couldn’t fathom that food production would increase tremendously thanks to new knowledge and technology. Our present food production is sufficient for seven times as many. Malthus didn’t pay attention to the fact that we live in a continuously changing civilisation, and the same kind of miscalculations are still made today. There are people who have even achieved the status of media superstars by presenting various dystopias and catastrophe scenarios. As early as 1968, Professor Paul Erlichs at Stanford University published the bestseller The Population Bomb, where he predicted that an imminent population explosion would result in hundreds of millions of deaths by starvation in the 1970s and 80s. Basically, he made the same mistake as Malthus, i.e. he treated knowledge and technology as if they were static phenomena. The most widely read environment report in the world, State of the World, was a loud whistle-blower when it was first published in the early 1980s. The Swedish version, Tillståndet i världen, was published yearly from 1984 and some years into the 2000s by the Worldwatch Institute Norden; I still have some of the early issues left. This report contains many valuable observations and suggestions, but also several basic analytical mistakes. In other words, it acts as an eye-opener, but it suffers from being tainted by political ideology. Its main weakness is that it doesn’t take the intrinsic driving forces of progress into account. State of the World was translated into most major languages and is, as already mentioned, the world’s most widely read environmental report. It has affected us all, directly or indirectly, through school and media. Even if the Swedish version I refer to was written some years ago, it is still worthy of discussion, firstly because it maintains an appearance of scientific validity, and secondly because it has served as a trendsetter for the general ideology which has been adopted by many later books and reports on the subject at hand. It still lives on as an engraved pattern in our conception of the world. In the report we can, for instance, read the following: A world where human desires and needs are fulfilled without the destruction of natural systems demands an entirely new economic order, founded on the insight that a high consumption level, population growth, and poverty are the powers behind the devastation of the environment. The rich have to reduce their consumption of resources so that the poor can increase their standard of living. The global economy simply works against the attempts to reduce poverty and protect the environment. We stubbornly insist to regard economic growth as synonymous with development, even though it makes the poor even poorer. Even if we up to this point have mainly described the environment revolution in economic terms, it is, in its most fundamental meaning, a social revolution: to change our values. Massive threat scenarios are still presented, for instance in the British scientist Tim Jackson’s book Prosperity Without Growth from 2009, which is one of the most widely read and frequently quoted works in this area. Tim Jackson, who is an economist and professor in sustainable development, explains how we humans are indulging in a ruthless pursuit of new-fangled gadgets in a consumption society running at full speed towards its doom. He also claims that material things in themselves cannot help us to flourish; on the contrary, they may even restrain our welfare. In other words, we cannot build our hopes that the economy, technology or science can help us to escape from the trap of Anthropocene, which has brought us to the brink of an ecological disaster. There are hundreds on books on this theme, and they all agree that the general state of the world is pure misery; everything is getting worse, the resources are being depleted, and that man will soon have destroyed the entire planet. The apparent reason for this, of course, is due to the consumption culture and the present financial system—which exposes man as a greedy, ruthless and ultimately weak creature. This attitude may serve a purpose as an eye-opener. But it is not very credible, and it may even be counterproductive. Of course, we can see a lot of problems ahead of us; but to solve them, we need the correct diagnostics instead of dubious doomsday prophesies. Focus: The Problem Since the focus of attention is so profoundly fixated on the problems in the climate and environmental debate, the progress already made—and the opportunities at hand—are often overshadowed. The example below will help to illustrate this point: In the year 2014, the Nobel Prize in physics was awarded to three scientists who had invented blue light emitting diodes—a technology that has made high-bright and energy-efficient LED lighting possible. As lighting accounts for 20% of the world’s total electrical consumption, this invention has the potential to radically reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. In an interview made by the major Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter, one of the prize winners, Hiroshi Amano, says the following about energy-efficient, inexpensive and high-bright LED lights: “They are now being used all over the world. Even children in the developing countries can use this lighting to read books and study in the evenings. This makes me very very happy”. Shortly after this announcement, the news headlines declared that LED lighting was a threat to the environment. This statement was based on a report showing that LED lighting could be hazardous to flies and moths, which in turn might disturb the eco system. This is a typical example of how progress pessimists and, not least the media, think and act. In this case, they focused on a potential problem associated with LED lighting, and ignored the tremendous possibilities that the new technology offered to dramatically reduce greenhouse gases and thus spare the eco system (not to mention all the other advantages). Books and reports of the kind mentioned above tell us repeatedly about disasters, threats, problems, collapses and famines. On the other hand, they are notoriously silent about the great improvements actually made—the reduction of extreme poverty (not only as a percentage but also in absolute numbers), longer lifespans, dramatic global progress in education and healthcare, etc. The lack of positive media coverage on the environment means that many people believe that too little is being done, which is quite understandable considering the one-sided nature of the information they are presented with. Alarmist reporting almost always reminds me of pirates: they are unreliable and half their vision is blocked by their eye patches. It is vital that the media not only one-sidedly focus on the misery without presenting the progress made and suggesting constructive courses of action. The quality of our decisions in all respects depends on our knowledge, insight and attitude. Real and Imagined Threats Many people are convinced that the climate and environmental problems are growing. It is certainly true that our planet has its limitations, but many of the predictions from alarmist literature have been proven false. In the 1980s, the forest dieback was a frequently discussed subject. To quote the well-known German news magazine Der Spiegel, an “ecological Hiroshima” was imminent. Most experts at the time claimed that a wide-spread forest death seemed unavoidable. Additionally, the general mood of impending doom was augmented by the threat of a nuclear disaster during the cold war. I remember the pessimistic discussions among friends and how frequently the gloomy reports appeared in Swedish and Finnish television. The future of humankind appeared to be depressingly bleak. But the forest dieback never happened. On the contrary, the forest area has been constantly expanding in Europe, even during the entire period when the forest was believed to be dying. Today, only two thirds of the yearly accretion in Europe are cut down, according to the Natural Resource Institute in Finland. There are different opinions as to why the large-scale forest dieback didn’t occur. One theory is that the researchers’ evidence and conclusions had been incomplete and too hasty; the forest was actually never in danger. Others suggest that the emission limitations implemented prevented the disaster. My point is that the environmental catastrophe did not happen. Some other environmental problems, exaggerated or not, that have concerned us during the last decades have also disappeared from the immediate agenda: overpopulation, DDT, the ozone hole, heavy metals, lead poisoning, soot particles, the waste mountain, and the acidification of our lakes. Unfortunately, some environmental problems, like soot particles and waste, still remain in some areas, especially in poorer countries, where there are other, even worse problems that have yet to be resolved. The conclusion is, however, that we and our society in most cases have handled threatening situations quite well. When alarming symptoms are noted, scientists and other experts are summoned, and we act according to their diagnoses. It is no big deal that the diagnoses are sometimes wrong, as long as the side effects are not too severe. The main thing is that we do our best to avoid disasters, and on the whole, humankind has succeeded rather well this far. As individuals, we react very differently to various kinds of threats. The closer and more tangible the threat is, the more violent are the reactions—while distant and invisible symptoms, like the depletion of the ozone layer, concern us less. In the latter cases, we have to trust the scientists’ and later the politicians’ reactions. Does this mean that disasters are avoided thanks to war headlines, threats, and anxiety? I don’t think that this is the most important explanation; rather, it is factual and science-based information that produces effective results. But if exaggerated threat scenarios and reports of misery are needed to inspire the necessary political opinion, acquire research funding and create behavioural changes, we will have to live with that. The most important thing to remember in this context is that the actions shouldn’t cause more harm than the original problem itself. The risk with exaggerated threat and misery reporting is that it may inspire an over-reaction based on misleading diagnoses, or the opposite—a paralysing feeling of helplessness. It is necessary to take threats against the climate and the environment seriously, but not to a degree where our ability to reason and act is blocked by fear or anxiety. Many environmental debaters claim that the fall of the Inca and Roman empires were caused by the same causes that are now threatening our present civilisation—a short-sighted over-exploitation and rape of nature. Easter Island is another popular example. However, in my opinion it is both worthless and irresponsible to judge the world situation of today by copying the outcome of earlier cultural endeavours in history. The inhabitants of the Inca empire and Easter Island didn’t have anything even remotely comparable with the organisations, technology, medicine or general knowledge of today. It would be like comparing a case of appendicitis in the past to a case today. In pre-modern times, it was a fatal condition. In this day and age, it is cured by a simple routine operation. Today, humankind is conscious of the climate changes and other ecological challenges. And we also have the knowledge and resources needed to act. Facts, Propaganda and Hidden Messages During all the years I have followed the development of technology and society, I have repeatedly observed how a mishmash of serious research, political propaganda, and the hidden agendas of individuals have been distributed more or less randomly by the media. There are of course many different kinds of alarmism— everything from well-founded research reports to exaggerated prophesies of doom. It is far from simple to separate the wheat from the chaff. The actions taken against ozone depletion, lead emissions and the toxic chemical, dioxin, are all examples of how research has shown the way to successful results. Today, greenhouse gas emissions top the list of issues deserving our gravest attention, as it is a global phenomenon—just as the depletion of the ozone layer once was. There are also a considerable number of local environmental problems, such as drought, air pollution, forest depletion and overfishing. All of these are real threats that have to be acted upon, even though they are not global. However, I am always disturbed when a single global environmental issue is bundled with an assortment of several local issues, rather like a simplified trademark advertisement for the negative consequences of civilisation. This makes the information abstract and inaccurate, ignoring the fact that different locales require different solutions. Fear and alarmism are natural reactions that once protected us when we were living at the mercy of nature—they are evolutionary relics from our life in the savanna. Today, the same properties can be significant drawbacks. The transition from a primitive, animal-like state to the society we have today must, on the whole, be counted as a great success. But many people regard the same world as over-exploited, depleted, unjust, war-ridden and balancing on the brink of destruction. How can people living in the same epoch have so entirely different views of the world? In the sustainability debate, there is one faction dealing with the natural resources and ecosystems, and another focusing on the redistribution of wealth. There is even a third faction discussing a minimalistic lifestyle; for example, downshifting, with less work and less material welfare. When all these ingredients are mixed without discretion, the result is an anxiety soup that many have choked on. In a situation like that, we cannot expect any constructive initiatives to materialise. Instead, it would be far better to explore, research and discuss each dimension separately. What Is the Real State of the Planet? It is easy to generalise and say that we over-exploit the planet’s resources and pollute the world with our waste. But how many care to examine these statements in detail and ask exactly which resources are over-exploited? • Are fish becoming extinct? It is true that overfishing occurs in many places, which is, of course, unsustainable. However, this is not an unavoidable threat to the world’s total food resources. Fortunately, there are several examples of fish stocks that have either recovered or started to replenish once the fishing effort has been eased. • Is the air being poisoned? Many are convinced that the air we breathe is becoming dirtier all the time. But that isn’t true, at least not in the Western world. From the year 1990, emissions of sulphur dioxide have been reduced by 80%, nitrogen oxides by 44%, volatile organic substances by 55%, and carbon monoxide by 62%. Despite these dramatic improvements, 64% of Europeans believe that pollution is increasing. • Are the forests dying? It is a general belief that the forests in the developed countries are dwindling. But that isn’t true; on the contrary, the wooded areas are expanding. However, the forests are decreasing in the poor countries, where forestry and farming are still major sources of income, as they once were in the industrialised countries. • Are we drowning in waste? There are many who believe that we are surrounded by constantly growing mountains of waste. In the developed countries, the truth is that increasing amounts of waste are being recycled and the landfills are decreasing. • Will there be enough phosphorus? Phosphorus is an important nutrient in farming, extracted from phosphate ore. Many scientists fear that the finite natural resource of phosphate ore will become depleted in the future, which may jeopardise the world’s food supply. But there are already working solutions for this problem, such as by reclaiming phosphorus through digestion residues and sewage sludge. There are also technological solutions for the chemical extraction of phosphorus from polluted water—the remediation of lakes and rainwater by removing phosphorus is already a common procedure. Here we achieve a win-win situation—phosphorus is collected while preventing the eutrophication of lakes. • Will there be enough energy to go around? A common statement is that the earth’s population is too large, and that we consume too much energy with respect to the climate. This is one of those issues where we have to think in terms of symptoms, diagnoses, and medication. The symptoms are there for all to see: climate change. On the other hand, the diagnosis that we consume too much energy is wrong. The correct diagnosis is that we are not using the right technology; i.e. energy efficient power production without harmful emissions. Consequently, the correct statement would be that we consume energy that is produced by technologies that are harmful to the climate. The difference in wording is important. As the first diagnosis is “too high energy consumption”, the remedy will be to use a different medication than a diagnosis based on “the wrong technology”. Alarmist reporting can inspire bad decisions if the statements aren’t systematically reviewed and evaluated. It can also be misguiding to express environmental threats in general terms. Actions must be based on precise specific symptoms with corresponding diagnoses. If the doctor discovers that the patient is lame and suffers from a high fever, it doesn’t help to predict imminent death. Maybe the lameness and the fever have different causes altogether! A successful cure would probably include two different diagnoses with separate medications. Several recent surveys of the general conception of the world have been made— one is Project Ignorance by Gapminder and Novus in Sweden. One of the questions asked was whether CO2 emissions per capita and year had increased or decreased in the world during the last 40 years. The surveyed group was large and representative in order to give a fairly accurate picture of the common opinion. No less than 90% believed that CO2 emissions had increased. The truth is that they haven’t increased at all. It is important that decision makers on all levels learn how to see the wood from the trees. Decisions based on false preconditions can halt technological development, and thus also the development of the economy, welfare, and a healthier environment. The flow of innovations in the climate and environmental areas is accelerating rapidly. This can be seen in the number of improvements that have occurred in recent years, which can be counted in the thousands. Such improvements have to be weighted on the same scale as the problems in this area. That is not to say the problems should be ignored—they need to be acted upon. But they should not be allowed to occupy our brains to the extent that our power to act is paralysed. Is the Notion of Sustainable Technology-Driven Growth Over-Optimistic? The development of a technological society has always been questioned. In the 19th century, critics claimed that the technological revolution would create poverty. In the 1970s, it was generally believed that the forest dieback would cause a disaster. In the 1980s, the acidification of lakes and throwaway mentality of society were regarded as manifestations of the devastating properties of growth and industrialisation. Today, many fear the environmental effects of air travel and the production of electronic devices. There are people who seriously wish to halt economic growth and wind back the clock to the society of the 1960s. They recall this time period as small-scaled and down-to-earth, stress-free and idyllic. But they tend to forget that the refrigerators of that time required 90% more electricity than today, and that our teeth were repaired with mercury fillings instead of plastic. There were no X-ray CT scanners and no medicines against ulcers. In addition, there were many more people living without electricity. There was also more widespread malnutrition, a higher infant mortality, and, in fact, more wars. Cars were fuelled by leaded petrol, and sulphur emissions were 90% higher than today. The acidification of lakes, as well as polluted streams and fields, were serious concerns. Since then, technological innovations have reduced sulphur emissions and removed the lead from car fuel. At any given point in history, there have been critics claiming that this was the time when we had reached the optimal point in the development of the modern society. But we hadn’t, not then and not now. And the more our countries are modernised, the greater our possibilities to care for animals and nature become. In the mid-1800s, the killing of large animals like sperm whales didn’t concern people to any significant degree, despite the cruel hunting methods using harpoons. The benefits of the whale fat, mainly used for lamp oil to facilitate reading in the evenings, overshadowed any empathic impulses. In the 1850s more than 70,000 people were employed by the American whaling industry. There were 900 ships in the world hunting whales, and during one of the most active years, 8000 whales were butchered, which provided more than 300,000 barrels of oil. The oil extracted from the head of the sperm whale, the so-called spermaceti oil, was especially sought-after. It was of very high quality and sold for 1.50 US dollars per litre in today’s monetary value. As a consequence, the number of sperm whales in the world rapidly dwindled. However, when oil drilling started in Pennsylvania in the year 1859, the price of whale oil began to fall. The fast transition to petroleum products for lighting and other applications is considered to have saved the last of the sperm whales. Thus, new technology can both contribute to the protection of threatened animal species and provide the wealth to make it affordable for us to even save predators. Imagine what would happen if we were able to bring back someone from the 19th century and tell them that today we move wolves though the air by helicopter in order to save the species and expand its habitat; our ancestor would probably rather go back to sleep than listen to such apparent stupidity. Pessimism Does not Support a Sustainable Development There is a lot of progress going on in the world today, but not without negative side effects. When improving the world and dealing with the side effects, an optimistic attitude provides us with a much better chance of success than a pessimistic view. The optimist carries a positive inner beacon to follow, while the pessimist is always looking for potential traps and drawbacks. As visions and conceptions of ideas often become self-fulfilling, it isn’t difficult to realise what’s most constructive. All decisions—big or small, conscious or not—are affected and guided by our inner beacon. When solving a problem, such as developing a new product for example, it is necessary to have a conception of a working solution in mind. As a product developer, it is of course necessary to review every minute step in the process and question the choices made. You have to ask yourself if there may be a better material or a smarter design. Strange as it seems, this continuous struggle in the mind of the developer may appear to be a kind of pessimism, as it is all about looking for weaknesses in the imagined solution. It is not dissimilar from the process a doctor follows when selecting a diagnosis and a remedy. You start with certain hypotheses, examine, exclude, test, question and verify until you are satisfied that you have made the correct diagnosis. Then the choice of medication becomes much simpler. It would be fatal if the doctor was pessimistic from the start and worked in the belief that it would be impossible to find a reason for the illness, or a working remedy. This could then be the conclusion that such a doctor would unconsciously try to verify. Would you like to have a doctor like that? The same is true for climate and environmental problems—we need optimists armed with critical thinking to solve them. There are also so-called climate change deniers, who believe that man hasn’t really affected the planet and its ecosystems to any significant degree. Some of them claim that the influence of the sun and other natural phenomena are so enormous that human activities have no bearing on global warming. Perhaps these deniers are so deeply pessimistic that they cannot imagine any possible solutions. For ages, man has harboured a certain distrust of his own species. Throughout history, various religions have emphasised human shortcomings and presented assorted consequential threats. During the last 30 years, such prophesies have increasingly often been introduced by environmental activists and some political groups, whose messages have been significantly supported by the media. The underlying conception of humanity isn’t flattering. The human race is considered to be fundamentally ruthless, greedy, short-sighted and evil. Threats against the climate and much other misery on earth are caused by human failure. However, if we take the time to study the progress that has been made by the human race throughout the ages, we actually get the opposite picture. Can it really be evil, greedy, and short-sighted beings who put their own lives at stake to treat people infected by Ebola or HIV in poor countries? Who are the ones that are continuously reducing the number of starving people on earth? Who are the ones that invent vaccines for the children of the world? Who are the ones that have developed a civilisation where an increasing number of people get educated, and who struggle to reduce the casualties of war? Why blame an entire species for atrocities that are actually committed by a mere fraction? Establishing a firm belief in humankind should be the first step on the road to sustainable development.

#### Their argument about “operating through desire” is wrong.

Mari Ruti 17, Toronto critical theory professor, The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory's Defiant Subjects, 103-4

For Edelman, desire is automatically a regressive force and the drive is automatically a politically disruptive one. In contrast, I think that the relationship between desire and the drive is messier than this dichotomy, not the least because—as I have tried to suggest all along—our most stubborn desires converge with the jouissance of the drive. I hope to have made it clear that this does not mean that I do not recognize that desire can be hijacked by normative sociality, including the consumer fantasies of neoliberal capitalism. Yet how desire functions—regressively or disruptively— even in the capitalist context of consumption is not clear-cut. Edelman’s paradigm implies that desire, insofar as it relies on the fantasy of future satisfaction, perpetuates a capitalist logic of consumption— a logic that induces us to move from one object to the next as quickly as possible—whereas the drive, in gaining its satisfaction from the lack of objects, undermines this logic. Simply put, if the drive has no need for objects, then clearly it has no need for capitalism. By this reasoning, if we do what McGowan encourages us to do—namely, start enjoying what we do not have—we automatically thwart the foundations of capitalism. On some level, I appreciate this perspective, for I have always led a minimalist life that is not centered on possessions, so much so that I can easily live out of a medium-sized suitcase for months at end. But on another level, it makes it difficult to account for our allegiance to objects that might actually deserve our devotion. What is more, it overlooks the possibility that the fixations of desire can also disrupt the current of consumption. As I have observed, a subject whose desire is obstinately preoccupied by a specific object is incapable of desiring other objects, thereby resisting capitalism’s attempts to mobilize desire. In the last chapter, I made this point in the context of talking about how our faithfulness to a deeply loved person can keep us from participating in the capitalist mentality that tells us that every object is easily replaceable. But to some extent the same logic applies to inanimate objects as well. For instance, I was so cathected to my ancient laptop that I used it for two years even after the components between the keyboard and the screen were so damaged that I could no longer close it: although I constantly worried that one day the screen would suddenly go blank on me, causing me to lose work—which had happened with my previous laptop—I held on to it even though it was entirely unpractical (unsuited for travel and so on). Similarly, I held on to an old cell phone that my students told me looked like a military phone from the 1980s for years after I had lost the cover to the battery. My favorite jeans are so full of holes that they are somewhat indecent to wear in public but I do it anyway. These may be banal examples, but they illustrate the manner in which our fidelity to our objects throws a monkey wrench into capitalism’s attempts to encourage us to consume. When Apple releases its newest model of an iPhone, I could not care less. I trust that the phone I have—a device that looks like it was made circa 2002—will last me another decade at least. The emphasis in my interpretation of desire falls on the object, on how the object—sometimes a culturally denigrated one—slips into such prominence for the desiring subject that the subject’s bond to this object becomes nonnegotiable. In other words, even though I have stressed the importance of being able to sever ties to damaging objects, I simultaneously recognize the ethical force of insisting on the value of objects that the social order—or those who represent this order in our lives—tells us are devoid of value. For me, the matter comes down to the affective resonance of the object: some objects, however socially “appropriate,” are not worth my investment; others, however socially “inappropriate,” merit my unwavering fidelity. Edelman, in contrast, approaches the issue from the perspective of the subject who seeks self-closure through its objects of desire. This is what leads Edelman to argue that desire keeps jouissance at a distance by propping up the subject’s fantasy of filling the void of its being whereas the drive—and by extension, the sinthomosexual who embraces the drive—“brings into visibility the force of enjoyment that desire desires to put off ” (2004, 86). I have admitted that desire strives to fill the void within the subject’s being. But given that it never succeeds in this endeavor, I do not see the need to align it with self-closure; the very inability of desire to fully attain the satisfaction it seeks guarantees the subject’s continued status as a being of lack (and therefore of openness). In this sense, Edelman has gotten things entirely backward: it is the subject of the drive —of jouissance—that closes upon itself whereas the subject of desire remains open to the world, including other people.

## C/A

#### Can’t stay contained—multiple pathways to global nuclear war.

Avery 13 – Lektor Emeritus & Associate Professor, U of Copenhagen

John Scales Avery, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such an extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

#### Extinction outweighs---it’s a categorically distinct phenomenon that outweighs other considerations.

Burke et al., Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ UNSW, Australia, ‘16

(Anthony, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25)

8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: it is a qualitatively different phenomena that demands its own ethical categories. It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions, let alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their unique histories and open-ended possibilities, but it threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly life.

IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the comprehensive negation that a mass extinction event entails. In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a matter of being and nonbeing, not one of life and death processes.

Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the enormity, complexity, and scale of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding. This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a matter of global ethics. It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life. Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change.

9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings.

The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds.

Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of diverse forms of being – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, ‘worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid. They can be created, modified – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds,70 which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.

#### A] Calculability is key! Innovations develop over time through experimental searches and unpredictable breakthroughs stemming from thousands of interactions. It’s impossible for the state to aggregate enough data to effectively allocate resources.

**Karlson et al. 20** --- Ratio Institute, Linköping University, Stockholm, Sweden.

Nils, Christian Sandström, & Karl Wennberg, 2020, “Bureaucrats or Markets in Innovation Policy? – a critique of the entrepreneurial state,” The Review of Austrian Economics, vol. 34, pg. 81–95.

Information problems concern the difficulty a public actor face in collecting the information and acquiring the knowledge enabling correct decision-making regarding, for example, the allocation of resources. As Hayek (1945) showed, it is practically impossible to aggregate information and knowledge about production conditions, business opportunities, customer preferences, etc. to any central unit in society. Such information is dispersed, local, and time-bound in character, even in today’s modern digital economy. With regard to innovation policy and the results reviewed above, there are numerous implications of Hayek’s argument.

First, the existence of a market failure is empirically difficult to prove, or measure. The original argument by Arrow (1962) was of a theoretical nature and has not been validated. One could expect the potential size of such a market failure to vary greatly depending upon institutional characteristics, industrial context, regional and national setting. Such differences along with the fact that it is a very methodologically challenging task to locate and compute the size of a market failure means that policymakers are put in the awkward position of trying to solve a problem that is unknown both in terms of its existence, size and location. Needless to say, such a situation is almost bound to result in malinvestments.

The second implication concerns that a market economy is more compatible with the notion of dispersed knowledge than a public policy intervention. Industrial development in a market economy characterized by innovations is often described as a complex evolutionary process (Nelson and Winter 1982). Through experimental search characterized by failures and unpredictable breakthroughs, the economy develops over time (Aldrich 1999). Individual market actors make mistakes and invest in the wrong technical solution or the wrong business model for a new technology (Delmar et al. 2011). If the actors themselves who operate in a market are unable to know which technology or business model is optimal, there is reason to question how a public actor in the form of a government agency or a policymaker can perform this task satisfactorily. Government involvement in the form of “picking winners,” that is, attempts to generate growth through government selection of technologies or firms, risks becoming expensive for taxpayers (Lerner 2009). Previous research has shown that venture capital investments tend to be highly spatial and build on social networks (Hochberg et al. 2007). The price mechanism provides aggregate information about customers’ demand, and the firms’ profits and losses. Information and knowledge are thus conveyed and generated among market actors in competitive markets who are nested together through social, economic and technological interdependencies, and this information is hard to extract from its origin and locate in a central policy unit.

#### B] The desire to be more productive is what promotes competition!

**Wu 16** --- Economic Analyst, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation

John, 11-29-16, “Despite China Favoring State-Owned Enterprises, Its Private Companies are More Innovative and Productive,” ITIF, <https://itif.org/publications/2016/11/29/despite-china-favoring-state-owned-enterprises-its-private-companies-are>

Private firms are not only more R&D intensive than SOEs, they too are better able to translate these R&D investments into productivity growth. Every 1¥ invested in R&D by a private firm returned an additional 0.16¥ in output, while every 1¥ invested in R&D by a SOE returned an additional 0.12¥ in output—[approximately a 30 percent difference](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570736).

China’s own experience with privatizing some SOEs since joining the WTO in 2001 should give them even more reason to fully embrace market-based economic trade policies. A separate [economic analysis](http://socialsciences.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Intellectual-Property-Protection.pdf) covering firm data between 1990 and 2013 shows that, on average, when a SOE switched to private ownership, R&D as a share of net assets doubled, or an increase of 0.14 percentage points. This surge in innovative activity also explains why patenting increased by 7.2 percent, which was accompanied by high-quality patents and more collaborative R&D with international companies.

Market dynamics explain most of this sizable difference in productivity and innovation outcomes between firm ownership types. Privately-owned firms tend to operate in more competitive industries, which forces them to make more effective R&D investments to stay ahead of other firms. Conversely, state-owned firms tend to operate in less competitive industries or are insulated from market competition induced through SOE-favoring policies that limit competition in such industries and create an uneven playing field for both domestic and international private companies.

#### ROR is a balancing framework, which means you calculate the positive and negative effects!

Hovenkamp, Assistant Professor, USC Gould School of Law, ‘19

(Erik, “Platform Antitrust,” 44 J. Corp. L. 713)

That is no longer the case, however, as the Supreme Court recently confronted platform commerce head-on in AmEx 111.13 In June of 2018, the Court issued its first decision on how antitrust's rule of reason 14 is to be applied in cases involving platform defendants. 15 It was superficially a question of how to define the "relevant market" for purposes of an antitrust adjudication. 1 6 In particular, the question was whether the market definition must include both groups of users, which would require a plaintiff to prove a net injury to competition across both user groups-not just to win on the merits, but simply to carry its initial burden. The Supreme Court held that it does. 17

Most of the important complexities arising under two-sided competition center on the juxtaposition of countervailing effects-that is, pro and anticompetitive effects-arising within the separate sides of the market. In fact, even outside the platform context, such a juxtaposition of plausible effects is very common in antitrust disputes. And the rule of reason ordinarily divides the burdens of establishing them; it bifurcates them into separate stages, delaying the need for potential balancing or "netting out" of the effects (which is notoriously difficult) until the final stage of the adjudication. By evaluating the effects carefully and independently, a court is better equipped to determine whether such balancing is genuinely necessary; and, if so, the court is at least in a better position to compare the relevant effects. However, the Court's AmEx III decision largely abandoned this burdenshifting framework, effectively collapsing the entire rule of reason analysis-and all of its intermediate inquiries-into the plaintiffs initial burden.

Whether or not one agrees with its holding, the AmEx III decision is inarguably a watershed moment for platform antitrust. Against this backdrop, this Article considers how antitrust ought to accommodate the distinctive features of platforms and platform competition. It focuses principally on conduct evaluated under the rule of reason, 18 with emphasis on vertical restraints and unilateral conduct. 19 The analysis is organized as follows: I begin by providing an overview of the distinctive features of platforms and platform competition, as reflected within the platform economics literature. Part III then explains how such factors may bear on the analysis of various restrictive practices that are already familiar within antitrust, but whose effects may become more or less concerning when undertaken by two-sided defendants. In Part IV, I address the economic effects of an important category of restraints that are unique to platform markets. Finally, Part V turns to the broad question of law that was at issue in AmEx III.

One of the important competitive dynamics arising in platform markets is known as "steering." 21 This refers to any efforts aimed at inducing users to opt for one platform over another. The restraint at issue in AmEx IIIwas an example of this: it prohibits its merchants from offering AmEx cardholders a better price at checkout if they agree to switch to an alternative card (e.g. Visa), since competing cards generally charge lower network usage fees to merchants. 22 But, more generally, steering restraints take many different forms, and arise in many platform markets. 3 In general, steering strategies are usually procompetitive, as they typically act as a vehicle for price competition among rival platforms. Restraints on steering should therefore be regarded as a potential source of serious antitrust concerns. However, as discussed in detail in Part III, many research articles suggest that such restraints may be necessary to maintain adequate participation, and thus regard their welfare effects as highly ambiguous. 24 The AmEx III opinion cites these commentaries copiously. Importantly, however, these arguments stem primarily from economic models involving a platform monopolist, with the operative restraint merely precluding efforts to steer users toward a nonpla'fform alternative (e.g. toward cash rather than using a monopolist's payment card platform). 25 But this is not a good representation of how such restraints usually operate in real-world commerce. In practice, most of the relevant restraints seek to prevent steering toward competing platforms, rather than a nonplatform alternative that lacks the same transactional efficiencies.

As I argue below, when a restraint merely prevents steering toward competing platforms, there is substantially less reason to presume that it might be justified for reasons relating to the market's two-sidedness. Instead, the more likely result is simply that it prevents users from switching to rival platforms that would provide them with better jointvalue. That would suggest the restraint does not enhance the market-wide volume of trade. Rather, at best, it merely reallocates transactions among platforms, albeit in a way that leaves transacting parties with diminished welfare on average. At worst, it affirmatively reduces the overall volume of trade by undermining price competition generally. This can occur for two reasons. First, the restraint may extinguish rival platforms' incentive to make competitive price offerings, as it may prevent transacting parties from switching to the competitor's platform in response to its price cut. Second, the restraint may induce sellers who transact over the platform to set higher retail prices for their own wares, which injures all consumers, whether or not they take advantage of the platform's transaction service.

The question of law addressed in AmEx III is extremely broad in scope, as it bears on the application of antitrust law to all kinds of restrictive practices that might be undertaken by transaction platforms. As noted above, while facially a holding about market definition, the Supreme Court's decision is in fact a major alteration of the rule of reason's burden shifting framework. The Court's analysis was guided principally by a number of antitrust academics that focus most of their attention on a simple point-in effect that "both sides matter," and that it would be inappropriate to focus on one side myopically. 26 While correct, this point was actually never in dispute. Even the district court, whose market definition was formally limited to the merchant side of the market, 27 expressly emphasized the importance of accounting for the market's two-sidedness. 28 Indeed, its analysis gives substantial attention to cardholders, and it even concluded that they were likely injured in addition to merchants. 2 9 Despite this, the AmEx III majority chastised the district court's approach as "looking at only one side of the platform in isolation."' 30

It is indeed true that a platform's conduct may have countervailing effects within the two sides, and that this requires courts to take the market's two-sidedness into account. 31 But it does not follow that the appropriate way to deal with this is to require a plaintiff to "net out" all such considerations merely in order to support its prima facie case-before the defendant has substantiated its asserted efficiency defense. This approach is also a substantial deviation from precedent. Most difficult cases evaluated under the rule of reason involve potential countervailing pro- and anticompetitive effects. 32 And the courts developed a multi-stage burden shifting framework precisely to deal with this difficulty. By construction, this framework contemplates that a plaintiff can carry its initial burden without having shown that the defendant's conduct is definitively anticompetitive on the whole; that is why it is merely the first stage among several.

Far from providing any necessary reform, the AmEx III decision merely developed a "law of the horse": a needless construction of new legal principles when the old ones would do just fine (and likely much better).33 It is true that platform economics has important implications for antitrust policy and practice; this Article gives substantial attention to that fact. But such considerations can already be accounted for-both more practicably and more reliably-within the rule of reason's existing structure. To that end, a much better approach would be to maintain careful consideration of platform economics throughout the established burden shifting framework, which is designed to work through complex cases in incremental steps and to cast light on countervailing effects through an efficient allocation of burdens.

#### China is revisionist—Empirics, internal doctrines and proximity guarantees China’s revisionist and a challenge for the U.S. – our threat isn’t constructed

Choi 18

Ji Young Choi, Associate professor in the Department of Politics and Government and affiliated professor in the International Studies Program and East Asian Studies Program at Ohio Wesleyan University. “Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and China's Ascent,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 42, Issue 1, January-March 2018, pages 61-84.

I have explored in light of historical and theoretical perspectives whether China is a candidate to become a global hegemonic power. The next question I will address is whether the ascent of China will lead to a hegemonic war or not. As mentioned previously, historical and theoretical lessons reveal that a rising great power tends to challenge a system leader when the former's economic and other major capabilities come too close to those of the latter and the former is dissatisfied with the latter's leadership and the international rules it created. This means that the rise of China could produce intense hegemonic competition and even a global hegemonic war. The preventive motivation by an old declining power can cause a major war with a newly emerging power when it is combined with other variables (Levy 1987). While a preventive war by a system leader is historically rare, a newly emerging yet even relatively weak rising power at times challenges a much more powerful system leader, as in the case of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Schweller 1999). A historical lesson is that "incomplete catch-ups are inherently conflict-prone" (Thompson 2006, 19). This implies that even though it falls short of surpassing the system leader, the rise of a new great power can produce significant instability in the interstate system when it develops into a revisionist power. Moreover, the United States and China are deeply involved in major security issues in East Asia (including the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Taiwan issue, and the South China Sea disputes), and we cannot rule out the possibility that one of these regional conflicts will develop into a much bigger global war in which the two superpowers are entangled. According to Allison (2017), who studied sixteen historical cases in which a rising power confronted an existing power, a war between the United States and China is not unavoidable, but escaping it will require enormous efforts by both sides. Some Chinese scholars (Jia 2009; Wang and Zhu 2015), who emphasize the transformation of China's domestic politics and the pragmatism of Beijing's diplomacy, have a more or less optimistic view of the future of US-China relations. Yet my reading of the situation is that since 2009 there has been an increasing gap between this optimistic view and what has really happened. It is premature to conclude that China is a revisionist state, but in what follows I will suggest some important signs that show China has revisionist aims at least in the Asia Pacific and could develop into a revisionist power in the future.

Beijing has concentrated on economic modernization since the start of pro-market reforms in the late 1970s and made efforts to keep a low profile in international security issues for several decades. It followed Deng Xiaoping's doctrine: "hide one's capabilities, bide one's time, and seek the right opportunity." Since 2003, China's motto has been "Peaceful Rise" or "Peaceful Development," and Chinese leadership has emphasized that the rise of China would not threaten any other countries. Recently, however, Beijing has adopted increasingly assertive or even aggressive foreign policies in international security affairs. In particular, China has been adamant about territorial issues in the East and South China Seas and is increasingly considered as a severe threat by other nations in the Asia Pacific region. Since 2009, for example, Beijing has increased naval activities on a large scale in the area of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. In 2010, Beijing announced that just like Tibet and Taiwan, the South China Sea is considered a core national interest. We can identify drastic rhetorical changes as well. In 2010, China's foreign minister publicly stated, "China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). In October 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping also used the words "struggle and achieve results," emphasizing the importance of China's territorial integrity (Waldron 2014, 166-167). Furthermore, China has constructed man-made islands in the South China Sea to seek "de facto control over the resource-rich waters and islets" claimed as well by its neighboring countries (Los Angeles Times 2015). As of now, China's strategy is to delay a direct military conflict with the United States as long as possible and use its economic and political prowess to pressure smaller neighbors to give up their territorial claims (Doran 2012). These new developments and rhetorical signals reflect significant changes in China's foreign policies and signify that China's peaceful rise seems to be over.

A rising great power's consistent and determined policies to increase military buildups can be read as one of the significant signs of the rising power's dissatisfaction with the existing order and its willingness to do battle if it is really necessary. In the words of Rapkin and Thompson (2003, 318), "arms buildups and arms races . . . reflect substantial dissatisfaction on the part of the challenger and an attempt to accelerate the pace of military catchup and the development of a relative power advantage." Werner and Kugler (1996) also posit that if an emerging challenger's military expenditures are increasing faster than those of a system leader, parity can be very dangerous to the international political order. China's GDP is currently around 60 percent of that of the United States, so parity has not been reached yet. China's military budget, however, has grown enormously for the past two decades (double-digit growth nearly every year), which is creating concerns among neighboring nations and a system leader, the United States. In addition to its air force, China's strengthening navy or sea power has been one of the main goals in its military modernization program. Beijing has invested large financial resources in constructing new naval vessels, submarines, and aircraft carriers (Economist 2012). Furthermore, in its new defense white paper in 2015, Beijing made clear a vision to expand the global role for its military, particularly its naval force, to protect its overseas economic and strategic interests (Tiezzi 2015).

Sea power has special importance for an emerging great power. As Mahan (1987 [1890]) explained cogently in one of his classic books on naval strategy, Great Britain was able to emerge as a new hegemonic power because of the superiority of its naval capacity and technology and its effective control of main international sealanes. Naval power has a special significance for China, a newly emerging power, as well as for both economic and strategic reasons. First, its economy's rapid growth requires external expansion to ensure raw materials and the foreign markets to sell its products. Therefore, naval power becomes crucial in protecting its overseas business interests and activities. Second, securing major sea-lanes becomes increasingly important as they will be crucial lifelines for the supply of energy, raw materials, and other essential goods should China become involved in a hegemonic war or any other major military conflict (Friedberg 2011). In light of this, it is understandable why China is so stubborn over territorial issues in the South China and East China Seas. In fact, history tells us that many rising powers invested in sea power to expand their global influence, and indeed all the global hegemons including Great Britain and the United States were predominant naval powers.

Another important aspect is that Beijing is beginning to voice its dissatisfaction with the existing international economic order and take actions that could potentially change this order. The Chinese economy has overall benefited from the post-World War II international liberal order, but the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have been dominated by the United States and its allies and China does not have much power or voice in these institutions. Both institutions are based in Washington, DC, and the United States has enjoyed the largest voting shares with its veto power. Along with other emerging economies, China has called for significant reforms, especially in the governing system of the IMF, but reform plans to give more power to China and other emerging economies have been delayed by the opposition of the US Congress (Choi 2013). In response to this, Beijing recently took the initiative to create new international financial institutions including the AIIB. At this moment, it is premature to say that these new institutions would be able to replace the Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, this new development can be read as a starting point for significant changes in global economic and financial governance that has been dominated by the United States since the end of World War II (Subacchi 2015).

#### Security in this context is good—Their theory purposefully denies objective threats for the sake of analytic clarity – examining whether threats are real and whether our security responses are ethical is the only effective middle ground

Floyd ’19 - Department of Political Science and International Studies Senior Lecturer in Conflict and Security

Rita Floyd, “Introduction” in The Morality of Security, Cambridge Core, April 2019, pp 10-12, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108667814>.

Securitization has been heavily debated in the scholarly community. Among other things much discussion has focused on the issue of whether securitization is satisfied simply by audience acceptance of the securitizing move, or whether it has to involve extraordinary measures (Balzacq, Le´onard and Ruzicka, 2015). All securitization scholars accept, however, that security threats are socially and politically constructed, or in other words that: ‘Security issues are made security issues by acts of securitization’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 204). This has allowed scholars to recognize what Jef Huysmans calls ‘the political force of security’ whereby ‘[s]ecurity is a practice not of responding to enemies and fear but of creating them’ (2014: 3). An exclusive focus on the constructedness of security means, however, that securitization scholars tend to ignore whether or not the threats that inform securitization are real or otherwise. And as Thierry Balzacq argues, this has had the disadvantage of securitization scholars overlooking the fact that securitizing moves that refer to ‘brute threats’ are more likely to succeed because, ‘to win an audience, security statements must, usually, be related to an external reality’ (2011b: 13). Balzacq’s observation is important in the context of this book as it goes some way towards paving the way for the inclusion of objective existential threats into securitization analysis. As I will argue in this book, real threats are important for the purposes of just securitization theory as only these may constitute a just reason19 for securitization.

The Copenhagen School’s refusal to ‘peek behind [threat construction] to decide whether it is really a threat’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 204) and the just war tradition’s insistence on real threats as just causes, appear to suggest insurmountable differences at the meta-theoretical level between the two theories. Importantly, however, the Copenhagen School’s unwillingness to, as they put it, ‘peek behind’ threat construction, does not stem from a denial that real threats exist (after all Wæver (2011: 472) recognizes that ‘lots of real threats exist’),20 but from the belief that the study of threat construction is ultimately more fruitful than pondering the presence of real threats (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 213; Buzan et al., 1998: 204). Beyond this, the decision not to try and examine whether security threats refer to real threats is also – at least in part – driven by a strong normative conviction. Thus by focusing on the political force of security as opposed to whether or not threats are real, Wæver and the Copenhagen School highlight the fact that securitization is/was not inevitable; things could have been treated in a different way (for example, perceived threats could have been criminalized or simply politicized). This enables scholars following this logic to highlight that securitizing actors bear responsibility for framing things in this way. Wæver calls this ‘the politics of responsibility’ (2011: 472), which he explains as follows: ‘The securitization approach points to the inherently political nature of any designation of security issues and thus it puts an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decisionmakers and activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this – or of not doing it?’ (Wæver 1999 cited in Wæver, 2011: 468; emphasis added).

The significance of the fact that securitization is a political choice cannot be overstated; however, it is also the case that decision-makers are likely to consider securitization the right political choice when they believe that they are in fact dealing with a real threat. In other words, the possibility of framing the issue differently will not be tempting if they believe that there is a real threat. Given that the Copenhagen School and their followers cannot tell them anything about the actual objective existence of the threat, the framework seems of limited persuasiveness here; it is simply the securitizing actor’s belief against the scholar’s argument that things could and perhaps should be different. Indeed the Copenhagen School recognizes ‘our inability to counter securitization (say, of immigrants) with an argument that this is not really a security problem or that the environment is a bigger security problem’ as the securitization approach’s ‘main disadvantage’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 206). I propose that if the ethical goal of securitization analysis is that securitizing actors take responsibility for their actions, then a better strategy is to begin by (helping them in) judging the objective existence of a threat, because unless there is a real threat, securitization is most definitely the wrong political and ethical choice. Importantly, however, as I argue in this book, the existence of a real threat does not automatically necessitate securitization (indeed this remains a political choice), neither does it – by itself – render it morally permissible; the presence of real threats is rather one important requirement for securitization to be justified. In other words, just securitization is informed by the idea that securitizing actors are not only responsible for choosing to securitize, they ought to be responsible for securitizing in an ethical manner. In my view, the fact that the original variant of securitization theory excludes objective existential threats not on ontological, but at least partially on normative grounds means that a variant of securitization theory that includes real threats is at least permissible, provided, of course, that a theoretical framework that shows how we can know that threats are real is delivered. In this book, such a framework is set out in Chapter 2. 21

[FOOTNOTE 21 BEGINS

1 Some scholars may object to the possibility of combining insights of opposed theories on the grounds of inconsistency – for example, critical security studies, with its postmodern roots, with insights gained from analytical, moral and political philosophy. Interestingly, Wæver has faced similar charges of inconsistency for combining elements that ordinarily don’t go together (notably, Wæver refers to himself as a poststructural realist). To these critics Wæver offers this persuasive riposte: ‘This criticism presupposes that these larger groups are internally consistent and mutually isolated. On the contrary, we all know numerous examples of internally consistent theories that draw on several traditions – and many more examples of theories that stay within their “box” and yet are horribly inconsistent. Therefore, investigations of the internal consistency and productivity of research traditions should focus on distinct theories, not loose collections hereof’ (Wæver, 2015:124). Generally speaking, I am critical of the tendency to confuse theory with ideology, and thus disallowing and discounting anything outside of one’s perceived and tightly regulated theoretical remit. In the past in IR such thinking has led to bad scholarship; thankfully now scholars are working to dispel artificially imposed dichotomies, such as that on the relationship between causation and discourse (Kurki, 2008).

#### Blanket opposition to U.S. military force sanctions atrocities – their critique is a conceptual shortcut that forces us to draw dangerous conclusions about war. The solution is pragmatic examination of ethical responses to particular conflicts.

Walzer 14 – Professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study and editor emeritus of Dissent Magazine.

Michael Walzer, “A Foreign Policy for the Left,” *Dissent*, Spring 2014, <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-foreign-policy-for-the-left>.

There are other examples of leftist support for the use of force—even by capitalist countries like the United States. Some Marxist militants argue that any war fought by a capitalist country is, by definition, an imperialist war. But the war in Korea, which was fought by an alliance of capitalist countries, was supported by most people on the American and European democratic left. A war against aggression, approved by the UN, could plausibly be called a just war. Nonetheless, there was left opposition: Michael Harrington (as a Catholic Worker) and David Dellinger (with the War Resisters League) marched against the war; I. F. Stone called it unjust, bravely and (I think) wrongly. The future editors of Dissent (breaking with many of their fellow Shachtmanites) supported the war, no doubt critically, which was the right way to do it.

In his history of the American left, Michael Kazin writes that ever since Woodrow Wilson’s administration, “liberals had ardently promoted wars to preserve and advance democracy. The conflict over Vietnam put an end to that tradition for decades to come.” But by the 1990s, a more minimalist liberal and left defense of war had emerged—heralded by the Black Book on Bosnia produced by the editors of the New Republic in 1995 and given full intellectual legitimacy by Samantha Power’s A Problem from Hell in 2002. The aim of what was called “humanitarian intervention” was not to promote democracy but to stop mass murder, rape, and ethnic cleansing.

NATO’s Kosovo war of 1999, driven in part by the Srebrenica massacre, was a near-left war: the Labour Party was in power in Britain, the Socialists in France, a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens in Germany, and the Democratic Left in Italy. The Clinton administration was a weak version of this left politics, but it provided the leadership essential to the war effort. Military intervention in Kosovo was opposed by people on the farther left, who could not credit its humanitarian motive. I remember being told by a “reconstructed” communist at the Gramsci Institute in Turin, Italy in March 1999 that NATO “must be” aiming to seize control of the Black Sea from the Russians. There was no other explanation for the “imperialist” war.

The more persuasive far left critique came later: that left interventionism in Kosovo made the war in Iraq easier to plan and defend. But that can’t be an argument against the use of force for urgent humanitarian reasons. It is rather an argument for making distinctions, which is always necessary in politics. The Iraq War was not a humanitarian intervention; it was (according to one of its justifications) a war to overthrow a brutal dictator and promote democracy. There were left arguments and precedents for a war of that sort, as I’ve already suggested, but there was also a very strong left argument against it—an argument made, perhaps for the first time, by the Socialist Party in 1917: “Democracy can never be imposed upon any country by a foreign power by force of arms.”

The Labour Party’s David Miliband was right when he said in 2008 that during the previous decades “the neoconservative movement seemed more certain about spreading democracy around the world” than the left did. The left, he argued, was “conflicted between the desirability of the goal and its qualms about the use of military means.” The qualms are reasonable when it comes to democracy promotion, but not, I think, when it comes to stopping a massacre. The campaign for intervention in Darfur, not the invasion of Iraq, was the closest continuation of the near-left’s Kosovo war.

5. National Liberation

Left internationalists don’t only argue about whether “we” should use force, but also about whether other people should do so. With regard to imperial powers, the answer is generally negative, which is generally right. Wars of national liberation, by contrast, are almost always supported, which, again, is almost always right. It is hard to remember, but in the 1940s the Zionist struggle for a Jewish state in Palestine was enthusiastically supported by most American and even most European leftists. W.E.B. Du Bois, for example, argued in 1944 for a post-imperial Middle East where the Jewish people would be able “to achieve its own national liberation in its own way and in line with its own culture and traditions.” Leftists also supported the partition of Palestine, when the UN voted for it in 1947—this was the first version of the “two-state solution.” For different reasons, British imperialists and Trotskyists everywhere were hostile to the idea.

But the best case with which to think about national liberation is the Algerian war for independence, where the struggle was led by the National Liberation Front (FLN), a secular left political movement whose militants had defeated other liberation movements, mostly by killing their members. The FLN’s war was just, but it was fought in murderous ways, which many French leftists defended—though these same people rightly condemned the murderous ways of the French oppressors. The oppressed, not for the first or last time, were awarded a right to be murderous. This is a typical leftist award, though I believe that it cannot be justified.

Consider Jean-Paul Sartre’s defense of FLN terrorism: “To shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remains a dead man and a free man.” As I argued in Just and Unjust Wars, the claim that it takes one dead European to produce one free Algerian is ominous. There weren’t enough Europeans in Algeria in the late 1950s; more would have had to be brought over if the Algerians were to liberate themselves by Sartrean means. Needless to say, Sartre himself did not volunteer to be the bird that gets killed so that the other can be reborn. Arguments of this sort suggest a manipulative view of morality, which is fairly common among right-wing “realists” but clearly has its left-wing version.

6. Shortcuts

Arguments about the use of force for humanitarian or liberationist purposes are complicated; they require close attention to local circumstance and particular histories. We have to think hard about the relation of means to ends. All this is difficult, and doing it right will produce judgments that seem, though they are not, radically inconsistent—like supporting Algerian independence but rejecting FLN terrorism. So ideological shortcuts have been worked out to make the judgments easier, shortcuts that are popular among many leftists and that require a left critique.

I have already alluded to one common shortcut, which is to support oppressed men and women, whatever they do. The difficulty is that the phrase “the oppressed” does not name an actual agent politically engaged in the world. The agents we encounter are organizations and movements that claim to be acting on behalf of the oppressed. Sometimes that claim is justified, but sometimes it isn’t; sometimes these groups are simply a new elite, the future oppressors of the oppressed. What is going on is a replacement at the top, not an uprising from below. Solidarity with oppressed men and women requires us to figure out what these people really want and need and then to look critically at the groups that claim to be acting in their name: Are they representative? Are they responsive? But there is no shortcut for doing that; it takes hard work and intellectual honesty.

The second shortcut, perhaps even more popular than the first, is to stand up always against “imperialism”—or, a shortcut inside the shortcut, always to oppose American policies abroad. Anti-Americanism is a common left politics, which, again, sometimes gets things right, and sometimes doesn’t. I believe that it got things right in Vietnam in 1967; it mostly got things right from the beginning of the twentieth century to the end in Central and South America; it got Iran right in 1953 (when leftists criticized the anti-Mossadegh coup), and Iraq in 2003; it gets NAFTA right, and the IMF, too. But that’s still not enough to make it a reliable shortcut. Remember that the defeat of Nazism and Stalinism, the two most brutal political regimes in world history, was in significant ways American work. This was work that many people on the left supported, as we should have.

In 1967 Dwight Macdonald wrote to Mary McCarthy that the American war in Vietnam proved “that despite all the good things about our internal political-social-cultural life, we have become an imperialist power, and one that, partly because of these domestic virtues, is a most inept one.” We have continued to be inept: in December 2005, with 100,000 American soldiers in Iraq, we organized an election—and our man came in third. This is a result, I think, without precedent in imperial history. Macdonald’s understanding of U.S. imperialism reflects a political intelligence and a moral balance that is mostly missing in contemporary anti-American writing.

The anti-American shortcut sometimes produces a short-circuited politics—as in the Syrian case where leftist writers predicted terrible consequences if the Americans intervened on the side of the anti-Assad forces. The predictions have come true even though the United States didn’t intervene, but once it was clear that the awfulness was not America’s fault, many leftists simply lost interest—except for an ongoing but not very effective engagement on behalf of the war’s victims.

Who was responsible for the ongoing war, for the killing, the terror, and the refugee crisis; what social forces were involved; what should we (on the left) make of them and how should we respond to them? This kind of analysis, standard in left critiques of imperialism, has mostly been missing. One reason for its absence is that it offers no opportunity to criticize America; a second reason is that it would require a close reading and sharp critique of Islamist politics.

Another much-used shortcut (though it doesn’t work in the Syrian case) is to oppose everything Israel does and to blame it for much that it hasn’t done, since it is the “lackey” of American imperialism or, alternatively, the dominant force in shaping American foreign policy. The policies of the current Israeli government require radical criticism—the occupation, the settlements, the refusal to suppress Jewish hooliganism on the West Bank. Nonetheless, the anti-Israel shortcut is an example, to paraphrase August Bebel, of the leftism of fools.

The last shortcut is simply to support every government that calls itself leftist or anti-imperialist and sets itself against American interests. This is different from the old Stalinist shortcut: support the Soviet Union whatever it does because it is the first proletarian dictatorship and the first workers’ paradise. That kind of politics is, I think, definitively finished, though it had a brief afterlife, focused on China and then, with very few believers, on Albania and North Korea. The more recent version celebrates Maximal Leaders like Nasser, Castro, or Hugo Chávez—along with occasional short-lived infatuations, as in the case of Michel Foucault and the future Ayatollah Khomeini. Leftist enthusiasm for populist dictatorships is one of our sad stories, which ends when resources run out, the failure to build the economy is suddenly apparent, and the military takes over. But often the Maximal Leader is a military man himself, and the repressive role of the army simply becomes more obvious over time. In Latin America today, the better left is represented by socialists and social democrats who reject demagogic populism and struggle to produce economic growth, greater equality, and a stronger welfare state—and who attract less enthusiasm from American leftists than they deserve.

7. The Politics of Pretending

Most leftists are idealists, and so we tend to idealize other people and to imagine that the world is more hospitable to our ideas than it actually is. At the same time, we know better; so I call this the politics of pretending. Consider the response of many leftists to the al Qaeda attack of 9/11. They argued that the United States should call the attack a crime and look to the UN and the International Criminal Court to deal with the criminals. That was the “Dial 911” response to 9/11 (it has been repeated again and again in response to later terrorist attacks), and it would have made sense if we lived in a world that was actually run by the UN and the ICC. But, as I argued in Dissent at the time, there was no one answering the phone at 911. Self-help isn’t, indeed, the only effective and justified response to criminal attacks; different forms of mutual assistance and collective security are possible, and the left should take a forward position in exploring them. But self-help has to be part of the story, given the world we live in, and it isn’t a good idea to pretend otherwise.

Another example: some leftists who opposed the Kosovo intervention argued that it didn’t have what every legal and justified use of force requires: UN authorization. Indeed, it didn’t. The UN Security Council is incapable, almost all the time, of acting in a timely way. Think of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia to shut down the killing fields; or the Indian invasion of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, to end the terror there; or the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda to overthrow the murderous regime of Idi Amin. None of these had or could have gotten UN approval. Many leftists opposed each of these interventions, pretending that the UN was already what leftists want it to be, an effective political agent. It isn’t that, and so the unilateral use of force is often, as Jürgen Habermas said of the Kosovo case, “illegal but morally necessary.”

The best and last example of leftist pretending is the insistence on the reasonableness of people who give no sign of being reasonable. Paul Berman writes of the large numbers of French socialists who supported the Munich Agreement that “they gazed across the Rhine and simply refused to believe that millions of upstanding Germans had enlisted in a political movement whose animating principles were paranoid conspiracy theories [and] blood-curdling hatreds. . . .” In the same spirit, many leftists were eager to describe the Chinese communists as “agrarian reformers.” And many today have been quick to grant the legitimacy of Islamist opposition to American bases in Saudi Arabia, say, or to the existence of Israel—and to ignore the demand for a shari’a state and the radical subordination of women. I am fairly sure that most of the people involved in all these cases knew, deep down, that they were pretending.

#### No root cause of militarism.

Bacevich, George McGovern fellow at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, ‘13

(Andrew J., *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*, pg. 205-212)

There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, “always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.”1 Mencken’s aphorism applies in spades to the subject of this account. To imagine that there exists a simple antidote **to the “military metaphysic**” to which the people and government of the United States have fallen prey is to misconstrue the problem. As the foregoing chapters make plain, the origins of America’s present-day infatuation with military power are **anything but simple**. American militarism is not the invention of a cabal nursing fantasies of global empire and manipulating an unsuspecting people frightened by the events of 9/11. Further, it is counterproductive to think in these terms— to assign culpability to a particular president or administration and to imagine that throwing the bums out will put things right. Yet neither does the present-day status of the United States as sole superpower reveal an essential truth, whether positive or negative, about the American project. Enthusiasts (mostly on the right) who interpret America’s possession of unrivaled and unprecedented armed might as proof that the United States enjoys the mandate of heaven are deluded. But so too are those (mostly on the left) who see in the far-flung doings of today’s U.S. military establishment substantiation of Major General Smedley Butler’s old chestnut that “war is just a racket” **and the American soldier “a gangster for capitalism”** sent abroad to do the bidding of Big Business or Big Oil.2 **Neither the will of God nor the venality of Wall Street suffices to explain how the United States managed to become stuck in World War IV.** Rather, the new American militarism is a little like pollution—the perhaps unintended, but foreseeable by-product of prior choices and decisions made without taking fully into account the full range of costs likely to be incurred.

In making the industrial revolution, the captains of American enterprise did not consciously set out to foul the environment, but as they harnessed the waters, crisscrossed the nation with rails, and built their mills and refineries, negative consequences ensued. Lakes and rivers became choked with refuse, the soil contaminated, and the air in American cities filthy.

By the time that the industrial age approached its zenith in the middle of the twentieth century, most Americans had come to take this for granted; a degraded environment seemed the price you had to pay in exchange for material abundance and by extension for freedom and opportunity. Americans might not like pollution, but there seemed to be no choice except to put up with it.

To appreciate that this was, in fact, not the case, Americans needed a different consciousness. This is where the environmental movement, beginning more or less in the 1960s, made its essential contribution. Environmentalists enabled Americans to see the natural world and their relationship to that world in a different light. They argued that the obvious deterioration in the environment was unacceptable and not at all inevitable. Alternatives did exist. Different policies and practices could stanch and even reverse the damage.

Purists in that movement insisted upon the primacy of environmental needs, everywhere and in all cases. Theirs was (and is) a principled position deserving to be heard. To act on their recommendations, however, would likely mean shutting down the economy, an impractical and politically infeasible course of action.

Pragmatists advanced a different argument. They suggested that it was possible to negotiate a compromise between economic needs and environmental imperatives. This compromise might oblige Americans to curtail certain bad habits, but it did not require changing the fundamentals of how they lived their lives. Americans could keep their cars and continue their love affair with consumption; but at the same time they could also have cleaner air and cleaner water. Implementing this compromise has produced an outcome that environmental radicals (and on the other side, believers in laissez-faire capitalism) today find unsatisfactory. In practice, it turns out, once begun negotiations never end. Bargaining is continuous, contentious, and deeply politicized. Participants in the process seldom come away with everything they want. Settling for half a loaf when you covet the whole is inevitably frustrating. But the results are self-evident. Environmental conditions in the United States today are palpably better than they were a half century ago. Pollution has not been vanquished, but it has become more manageable. Furthermore, the nation has achieved those improvements without imposing on citizens undue burdens and without preventing its entrepreneurs from innovating, creating, and turning a profit.

Restoring a semblance of balance and good sense to the way that Americans think about military power will require a similarly pragmatic approach. Undoing all of the negative effects that result from having been seduced by war may **lie beyond reach**, but Americans can at least make them more manageable and thereby salvage their democracy. In explaining the origins of the new American militarism, this account has not sought to assign or to impute blame. None of the protagonists in this story sat down after Vietnam and consciously plotted to propagate perverse attitudes toward military power any more than Andrew Carnegie or John D. Rockefeller plotted to despoil the nineteenth-century American landscape. The clamor after Vietnam to rebuild the American arsenal and to restore American self-confidence, the celebration of soldierly values, the search for ways to make force more usable: all of these came about because groups of Americans thought that they glimpsed in the realm of military affairs the solution to vexing problems. The soldiers who sought to rehabilitate their profession, the intellectuals who feared that America might share the fate of Weimar, the strategists wrestling with the implications of nuclear weapons, the conservative Christians appalled by the apparent collapse of traditional morality: none of these acted out of motives that were inherently dishonorable. To the extent that we may find fault with the results of their efforts, that fault is more appropriately attributable to **human fallibility than to malicious intent**. And yet **in the end it is** not motive that matters but outcome. Several decades after Vietnam, in the aftermath of a century filled to overflowing with evidence pointing to the limited utility of armed force and the dangers inherent in relying excessively on military power, the American people have persuaded themselves that their best prospect for safety and salvation lies with the sword. Told that despite all of their past martial exertions, treasure expended, and lives sacrificed, the world they inhabit is today more dangerous than ever and that they must redouble those exertions, they dutifully assent. Much as dumping raw sewage into American lakes and streams was once deemed unremarkable, so today “global power projection”—a phrase whose sharp edges we have worn down through casual use, but which implies military activism without apparent limit—has become standard practice, a normal condition, one to which no plausible alternatives seem to exist. All of this Americans have come to take for granted: it’s who we are and what we do.

Such a definition of normalcy cries out for a close and critical reexamination. Surely, the surprises, disappointments, painful losses, and woeful, even shameful failures of the Iraq War make clear the need to rethink the fundamentals of U.S. military policy. Yet a meaningful reexamination will require first a change of consciousness, seeing war and America’s relationship to war in a fundamentally different way.

Of course, **dissenting views already exist.** A rich tradition of American pacifism abhors the resort to violence as always and in every case wrong. Advocates of disarmament argue that by their very existence weapons are an incitement to violence. In the former camp, there can never be a justification for war. In the latter camp, **the shortest road to peace begins with the beating of swords into ploughshares**. These are principled views that deserve a hearing, more so today than ever. By discomfiting the majority, advocates of such views serve the common good. But to make full-fledged pacifism or comprehensive disarmament the basis for policy in an intrinsically disordered world would be to open the United States to grave danger.